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Earnings Dynamics and Inequality among Men across 14 
EU Countries, 1994-2001: Evidence from ECHP 
 
This paper analyses the dynamic structure of individual earnings across 14 EU countries over 
the period 1994-2001 using ECHP. Understanding wage mobility and its link with the 
evolution of cross-sectional earnings inequality is important from a welfare perspective, 
particularly given the large variety in national cross-sectional wage inequality. This is highly 
relevant in the context of the changes that took place in the EU labour market policy 
framework after 1995 under the incidence of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy, which 
recommend policies to increase wage flexibility, lower non-wage labour costs and allow 
relative wages to better reflect individual differences in productivity and local labour market 
conditions. What is the source of earnings variation? Did the increase in cross-sectional 
wage inequality observed in some countries result from greater transitory fluctuations in 
earnings and individuals facing a higher degree of earnings mobility? Or is this rise reflecting 
increasing permanent differences between individuals with mobility remaining constant or 
even falling? Are there common trends in earnings inequality and mobility across countries? 
Equally weighted minimum distance methods are used to estimate the covariance structure 
of earnings, decompose earnings into a permanent and a transitory component and conclude 
about their evolution. As expected, a notable change was an increased country 
heterogeneity, which translated itself in the level and evolution of the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality components. The decrease in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an 
increase in mobility, and therefore a decrease in the importance of the permanent component 
relative to the transitory component in Denmark, Belgium and Spain, and by a decrease in 
earnings mobility in Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria. In Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, and Finland, the increase in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by a 
decrease in mobility, whereas in Netherlands by an increase. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the extent of individual earnings dynamics has increased greatly in recent years and 
was fuelled mainly by the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s, which triggered a strong debate with respect to the driving factors 
and the implications of this increase.  
This paper analyses the dynamic structure of individual earnings in order to explain what is 
happening  behind  the  changes  in  the  distribution  of  labour  market  income  across  14  EU 
countries over the period 1994-2001 using ECHP. More precisely, the aim is to examine the 
extent  to  which  changes  in  cross-section  earnings  inequality  reflect  transitory  or  permanent 
components of individual lifecycle earnings variation. So far, at the EU level, no study attempted 
to analyse and to understand in a comparative manner earnings dynamics and the contributions 
of changes in permanent and transitory components of earnings variation to the evolution of 
cross-sectional earnings inequality.  
Understanding wage dynamics is vitally important from a welfare perspective, particularly given 
the large variation in the evolution of cross-sectional wage inequality across Europe over the 
period 1994-2001. It is highly relevant to understand what the source of this variation is. Did the 
increase  in  cross-sectional  wage  inequality  observed  in  some  countries  result  from  greater 
transitory fluctuations in earnings and individuals facing a higher degree of earnings mobility? 
Or is this rise reflecting increasing permanent differences between individuals with mobility 
remaining constant or even falling?  What about countries that recorded a decrease in cross-
sectional earnings inequalities, what lessons can we learn from them? Is this decrease the effect 
of  an  increase  in  mobility  which  helped  individuals  improve  their  income  position  in  the 
distribution of permanent income? Are there common trends in earnings inequality and mobility 
across different  countries? Understanding the contributions of the changes in permanent  and 
transitory components of earnings variation to increased cross-sectional earnings inequality is 
very  useful  in  the  evaluation  of  alternative  hypotheses  for  wage  structure  changes  and  for 
determining the potential welfare consequences of rising inequality. (Katz and Autor 1999)  
These questions are relevant in the context of the changes that took place in the EU labour 
market policy framework after 1995 under the incidence of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy and 
the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, which recommended policies to increase wage flexibility, lower non-
wage labour costs and allow relative wages to better reflect individual differences in productivity 
and  local  labour  market  conditions.  (OECD  2004)  Before  1995,  Europe  could  have  been 
described as making labour more expensive, accompanied by a decline in employment and an 
increase  in  productivity.  Starting  at  different  dates  for  different  policies,  Europe  began  the 
process of shifting toward making labour less expensive, accompanied by higher employment 
per capita but lower average productivity per hour.(Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008) This appears 
to have worsened the apparent trade-off between a strong employment performance and a more 
equal distribution of earnings, consistent with relative labour demand having shifted towards 
high-skilled workers. OECD (2004) 2 
 
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) analyzed the background changes that were implemented in the 
European labour market under the two strategies and their impact on employment per capita after 
1995.  These  strategies  were  aimed  to  turnaround  the  trends  imposed  by  the  labour  market 
policies implemented in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s to reduce employment per capita. The 
reasoning behind reducing employment per capita was to fight unemployment (see Nickell et al. 
2005). To alleviate the high unemployment, governments increased the generosity and duration 
of unemployment benefits. To limit the increase in unemployment, they attempted to regulate 
layoffs through employment protection legislation (EPL). To spread the available jobs across the 
population, they resorted to legislation favouring early retirement and shorter hours of work, the 
so called “work sharing” (Alesina, Glaeser et al. 2006).  
The turnaround in the institutional and policy framework occurred more or less after 1995, and 
the main catalyst was the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy. The shift was moved from alleviating 
unemployment to policies aimed to increase employment per capita. For a detailed description of 
the changes in the policy and institutional variables refer to Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) and 
OECD (2004). Here are just a few of them. The tax wedge, defined as the total percentage rate of 
personal income and payroll taxation, exhibited a high turnaround at exactly 1995 for all the 
countries except the continental ones. The largest decline was in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
followed by Nordic and Mediterranean countries. The OECD index of employment protection 
legislation (EPL), which is considered to be a key factor in generating labour market rigidity, 
also exhibited a sharp turnaround at the same time: it was relatively flat until the early 1990’s 
and  then  exhibited  a  substantial  decline  in  the  Nordic  and  Mediterranean  countries.  In  the 
Continental countries it started decreasing after 1995 and continued until early 2000s. The index 
of  product  market  regulation  (PMR)  declined  through  almost  the  entire  period,  though  the 
decline began at varying times in the different country groups. Union density shows similar 
behaviour. Unemployment benefits rose. The possible static effects of these policies are raising 
employment  and  reducing  productivity,  whereas  the  possible  dynamic  effects  are  raising 
investment  following  the  raise  in  employment  and  raising  incentives  for  adoption  of  new 
technologies, which implied a shift in the demand for skills.  
OECD (2004) reported that there has been a steady decline of trade union density in most OECD 
countries  over  the  past  few  decades,  except  for  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden. 
Regarding the collective bargaining coverage, which measures the real extent to which salaried 
workers are subject to union-negotiated terms and conditions of employment, most countries are 
characterized  by  stable  or  increasing  coverage  rates.  Regarding  the  level  of  the  bargaining 
structures, all OECD countries moved towards greater decentralization, which could result in 
greater inter-firm wage differentials. As concluded by the OECD (2004) report, a high union 
density and bargaining coverage, and a high centralisation/co-ordination of wage bargaining tend 
to go hand-in-hand with lower overall wage inequality.  
As pointed out both by Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) and OECD (2004), the most notable 
change after 1995 in Europe has been increased country heterogeneity. We will investigate how 
this heterogeneity translates itself in the level and components of the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality. Equally weighted minimum distance methods are used to estimate the covariance 
structure of earnings, decompose earnings into a permanent  and a transitory component and 
conclude about their evolution.  3 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section two introduces the theoretical background for 
wage differentials. Section three provides a description of the data. Section three describes of the 
dynamic structure of individual log earnings for 14 EU countries under analysis. Section four 
introduces the econometric specification and estimation method of covariance structures. Section 
five fits the error components models to the covariance structure for each country, decomposing 
the change in inequality into that accounted for by the change in the permanent and transitory 
components. Lastly, section six offers some conclusions. 
2.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
As pointed out by Katz and Autor (1999), the existing literature contains many explanations for 
the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. However they are not generally applicable to all countries.  
The theory regarding the determinants of wage differentials goes back to Adam Smith, which 
provided  a  comprehensive  discussion  in  his  capital  work,  The  Wealth  of  Nations.  It  was 
emphasized  that  wage  differentials  are  determined  by  competitive  factors  relating  to  the 
workplace (e.g. cost of training), by innate abilities and by labour market institutional factors, 
which regulated wages, restricted wages and labour mobility. The tension between the demand 
and  supply  factors  and  the  institutional  factors  affecting  wage  structures  that  emerged  from 
Adam Smith’s analysis has remained until today one of the key themes of research on the wage 
structure.  Following  Freeman  and  Katz  (1994),  this  supply-demand-institutions  (SDI) 
explanation for the changes in the wage structure has three parts.  
The first part assumes that different demographic and skill groups are imperfect substitutes in 
production, which implies that shifts in the demand and supply for labour skills can alter wage 
and employment outcomes. Potential important sources of shifts in the relative demand among 
skill groups include skill-biased technological change and a complementary increase in the prices 
of other inputs, and forces of globalization (trade and outsourcing). Sources of relative supply 
include cohort size variation, changes in access to education, immigration.  
The second part states that the shock in the demand and supply may have different effects on 
wages  and  employment,  depending  on  different  wage-setting  mechanisms  and  other  labour 
market institutional factors. The stronger the wage-setting mechanism is, meaning the higher 
trade union density, the higher the union coverage and the higher the centralisation/co-ordination 
of wage bargaining, the less impact these shocks have on wages. As argued by OECD (2004), 
there is strong evidence that unions reduce wage inequality and that this compression effect is 
strongest  in  countries  where  union  membership  and  bargaining  coverage  are  high,  and 
bargaining is centralised and/or co-ordinated (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 1999, 
2002; OECD, 1997a). National labour markets characterized by decentralized wage bargaining 
experience also a higher skill premia and a higher responsiveness of wages to local conditions, 
therefore a higher wage inequality.   
Thirdly, institutional changes, such as changes in the degree of unionization or the degree of 
centralization/co-ordination of collective bargaining can have an impact on the wage structures.  4 
 
Katz and Autor (1999) used the SDI model to look at cross-country differences in wage structure 
changes. The shift in demand for more skilled workers did not result in a sharp increase in wage 
dispersion for all OECD countries. The differences in the growth of skills supply appear to be an 
important  factor  in  explaining  cross-country  differences.  The  same  holds  for  labour  market 
institutions.  Countries  in  which  unions,  wage  bargaining  structure  play  a  larger  role  in  the 
determination of wages recorded smaller increases in inequality. However, the key issue in the 
interplay between demand, supply and institutions is the erroneous assumption that institutional 
change is exogenous. The reality is that institutions are influenced by labour market forces. As 
argued by Freeman and Gibbons (1995), shifts in supply and demand that raise relative wage 
differentials  are  expected  to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  centralized  collective  bargaining  and 
lower union influence on the wage setting mechanism.  
2.1.Permanent and transitory components of earnings inequality 
Following the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954), individual earnings are 
composed from a permanent and a transitory component. The permanent component of earnings 
reflects personal characteristics, education, training and other systematic elements. The transitory 
component captures the chance and other factors influencing earnings in a particular period and 
is expected to fade off over time. Following the structure of individual earnings, the overall 
inequality is composed from the inequality in the transitory component and the inequality in the 
permanent component of earnings.  
One  approach  for  explaining  changes  in  wage  differential  is  to  decompose  overall  wage 
inequality into the permanent and transitory components. The evolution of the overall earnings 
inequality  is  determined  by  the  cumulative  changes  in  the  two  inequality  components.  The 
change in each of the components could be linked with factors from the SDI model. An increase 
in the cross-sectional earnings inequality could reflect a rise in the permanent and/or transitory 
component of earnings inequality. The rise in the inequality in the permanent component of 
earnings may be consistent with increasing returns to education, on-the-job training and other 
persistent  abilities  that  are  among  the  main  determinants  of  the  permanent  component  of 
earnings, meaning enhanced relative earnings position of the highly skilled individuals. (Mincer 
1957; Mincer 1958; Mincer 1962; Mincer 1974; Hause 1980). The increase in the inequality of 
the transitory component of earnings may be attributed to the weakening of the labour market 
institutions (e.g. unions, government wage regulation, and internal labour markets), increased 
labour market instability, increased competitiveness, a rise in the temporary workforce which 
increase earnings exposure to shocks. A period of skill-biased technological change with the 
spread of new technologies can on the one hand increase the demand for skills, and on the other 
hand it can increase earnings instability. (Katz and Autor 1999). Rodrik (1997) argued that also 
globalization  and  international  capital  mobility  can  increase  wage  instability.  Overall,  the 
increase in the return to persistent skills is expected to have a much larger impact on long-run 
earnings inequality than an increase in the transitory component of earnings. (Katz and Autor 
1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002) 
Next we introduce several models of earnings dynamics that have been dominating the literature 
on  transitory  and  permanent  earnings  inequality  over  the  past  30  years.  To  begin  with,  we 
introduce the simplest specification, which in spite of its simplicity provides a very intuitive 5 
 
insight  into  the  decomposition  of  earnings  into  their  permanent  and  transitory  components. 
Based on this specification earnings are being decomposed as follows: 
 
22 , (0, ), (0, ), 1,..., , 1,..., it i it i it v i Y v iid v iid t T i N             (1) 
where  i    represents  the  permanent  time-invariant  individual  specific  component  and  it v  
represents the transitory component, which is independent distributed both over individuals and 
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Because i    is  assumed  to  incorporate  the  effect  of  lifetime  persistent  individual  specific 
characteristics  such  as  ability,  the  variance  of  the  permanent  component 
2
    represents  the 
persistent dispersion of earnings or the inequality in the permanent component of earnings. The 
transitory shocks are captured by the transitory variance 
2
v   and are assumed to persist only one 
year.  
This model facilitates the understanding of the inequality decomposition into its permanent and 
transitory  components.  The  variance  of  earnings  at  a  certain  point  in  time,  as  a  measure  of 
earnings dispersion, is composed both from a permanent and transitory dispersion (
22
v    ). 
The covariances, on the other hand, are determined solely by the permanent component (
2
  ). 
Therefore,  the  assessment  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  components  in  the  overall 
earnings dispersion is straightforward: the ratio 
22 / y    captures the relative importance of the 
permanent  component,  whereas  the  ratio 
22 / vy    captures  the  relative  importance  of  the 
transitory component.  
Notwithstanding  its  attractive  features,  the  empirical  evidence  rejected  the  rigid  restrictions 
imposed by model (1). One of the main drawbacks of model (1) is that it does not allow for 
changes in  earnings inequality over time. Other studies ((Katz 1994; Moffitt  and Gottschalk 
1995) took the model complexity further by allowing the covariance structure of earnings to vary 
over time. To account for these time effects, these models considered also time specific loading 
factors or shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with 
calendar time.  
12 it t it t it Yv         (2) 
, 1,2 kt k     are  time-varying  factor  loadings  on  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  of 
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An increase in either time loading factors generates an increase in the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality.  The  nature  of  the  change  in  inequality  depends  on  which  of  the  loading  factors 
changes. On the one hand, a persistent rise in  1t   increases the permanent or long-run inequality 
(inequality in earnings measured over a long period of time, such as lifetime earnings). As  1t   
can be interpreted as time-varying return to skills or skill price, its increase suggests that the 
relative  labour  market  advantage  of  high  skill  workers  is  enhanced.  In  this  situation,  the 
autocovariances grow in greater proportion that than the variance, causing the autocorrelation to 
increase. As a consequence, the increase in overall cross-sectional inequality is accompanied by 
a decrease in mobility. On the other hand, an increase in  2t   without a change in  1t   increases 
cross-sectional earnings inequality by increasing the transitory inequality, but without any impact 
on long-run or permanent inequality. In this situation the rise in the variances is not accompanied 
by a rise in the autocovariances, hence autocorrelations decrease and the increase in the overall 
inequality is accompanied by an increase in mobility. (Baker and Solon 2003) As pointed out by 
Katz and Autor (1999),  1t   maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but 
causes a persistent increase in the spread of the distribution and an increase in  2t   changes the 
rank  of  the  individual  in  the  short-run.  In  other  words  an  increase  in  the  time  parameters 
associated with the permanent component of earnings indicates a growing earnings inequality 
with no impact on the relative position of individuals in the distribution of permanent earnings, 
whereas an increase in the transitory time parameters indicates an increase in earnings mobility. 
Although model (2) incorporates changes over time in the permanent and temporary components 
of earnings inequality, it disregards other important features of earnings dynamics. Firstly, it 
disregards the cohort effects. As argued by Katz and Autor (1999), the increased wage inequality 
may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved labour quality within recent entry cohorts, 
steaming from unequal school quality. Some studies brought evidence against the hypothesis that 
the return to education is the same for different cohorts. These changes could be attributed either 
to the cohort effects or to the larger impact of the labour market shocks on younger than on older 
cohorts of workers. In the same line of thought, Freeman (1975) put forward the “active labour 
market”  hypothesis,  which  postulates  that  changes  in  the  labour  market  conditions,  such  as 
changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect mainly new entrants in the labour market. To 
account for these cohort effects, these models considered also cohort specific loading factors or 
shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with cohort.  
1 1 2 2 it c t it c t it Yv          (4) 
where , 1,2 jc j   are cohort specific loading factors. 
Secondly, regarding the permanent component, some studies brought evidence in favour of the 
“random growth rate model” or the “profile heterogeneity model”: (Hause 1977; Lillard and 
Weiss 1979; MaCurdy 1982; Baker 1997; Cappellari 2003)  
22 , (0, ), (0, ), ( , ) it i i it i i i i age iid iid E                    (5) 
According to this model, which is consistent with labour market theories such as human capital, 
and  matching  models,  each  individual  has  a  unique  age-earning  profile  with  an  individual 7 
 
specific intercept (initial earnings  i  ) and slope (earnings growth  i  ) that may be systematically 
related. The variances 
2
   and
2
   capture individual heterogeneity with respect to time-invariant 
characteristics and age-earnings profiles. The covariance between  i   and  i  ,   , represents a 
key  element  in  the  development  of  earnings  differentials  over  the  active  life.  A  positive 
covariance  between  i    and  i    implies  a  rising  inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of 
earnings over the life cycle, which is consistent with the school-matching models where the more 
tenure one individual accumulates, the more is revealed about his ability. Thus highly educated 
people are expected to experience a faster growth in their earnings as the quality of the match is 
revealed to their employers. A negative covariance implies that the two sources of heterogeneity 
offset  each  other,  which  is  consistent  with  the  on-the-job  training  hypothesis (Mincer  1974; 
Hause 1980). A negative covariance is expected to generate mobility within the distribution of 
the permanent component of earnings. (Cappellari 2003) 
This structure is equivalent to a random coefficient model where the intercept and the coefficient 
on age in model (5) are randomly distributed across individuals. Therefore, because earnings 
evolve along an individual specific age profile, a good prediction of future earnings requires 
additional information besides the current earnings. 
An alternative/additional specification for the permanent component of earnings is the “random 
walk model” or the “unit root model”, which is used in the literature to accommodate earnings 
shocks that might have permanent effects: (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Moffitt and 
Gottschalk 1995; Dickens 2000).  
2
, 1 , 1 , (0, ), ( , ) 0 ia i a ia ia i a ia u u iid E u             (6) 
Equation (6) specifies the random walk process, where the current value depends on the one 
from  the  previous  age  and  an  innovation  term  ia  ,  which  represent  white-noise  non-mean-
reverting shocks to permanent earnings. In other words,  ia   accommodates any permanent re-
ranking of individuals in the earnings distribution. As argued by Baker (1997), the intuition for 
this model is not obvious, but the high persistency of the unit root model might result from low 
rates of depreciation on human capital investments or labour market conditions through implicit 
contacts. In this model, current earnings are a sufficient statistic for future earnings.  
Thirdly, regarding the transitory component of earnings, previous research has brought evidence 
that transitory earnings might be serially correlated. Therefore, a more general autocorrelation 
structure is called for, that relaxes the restriction on  ' it vs  from the canonical model. For the 
construction  of  such  a  structure,  longitudinal  studies  on  earnings  dynamics  turned  to  error 
processes from the literature on time series analysis. Based on MaCurdy (1982), the structure of 
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it   is assumed to be white noise with mean 0 and variance 
2
  . The variance 
2
0,c    measures the 
volatility of shocks at the start of the sample period and 
2
   the volatility of shocks in subsequent 
years.  j   is the autoregressive parameter with  0 1   , which measures the persistence of shocks. 
j   is the moving average parameter with  0 1   ., which accommodates sharp drops of the lag-j 
autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances. In this model, the autoregressive and 
moving average parameters are assumed to be constant over time.  
2.2.Earnings Mobility 
Another aspect relevant to the evolution of earnings differentials is earnings mobility, defined by 
Katz and Autor (1999) as the rate at which individuals shift positions in the earnings distribution. 
Earnings  mobility  is  closely  related  to  the  importance  of  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components in earnings variation. A large contribution of the permanent component implies that 
individual earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change their income 
position to a large extent experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. Therefore, the changes in 
earnings mobility are determined by the extent to which the changes in cross-sectional inequality 
are driven by changes in the permanent or transitory variance. A rise only in the permanent 
inequality is associated with a decline in mobility rates, whereas a rise only in the transitory 
variance  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  mobility.  Equal  proportional  increases  in  both 
components  will  leave  mobility  unchanged  in  spite  of  increasing  overall  cross-sectional 
inequality. It becomes obvious that the question regarding the link between earnings mobility 
and  earnings  inequality  does  not  have  a  straight  forward  answer.  As  underlined  by 
Dickens(1999), “changes in earnings mobility could either work to offset or to increase changes 
in cross-sectional dispersion”, with very different implications for permanent earnings inequality. 
Indeed,  mobility  is  beneficial  when  it  helps  low  paid  individuals  to  improve  their  income 
position in the long-term income distribution.  
There are many approaches to measuring mobility. In this study, mobility is measured by the 
ratio between the permanent and transitory inequality.  
2.3.Literature Review  
The existing literature on earnings dynamics is predominantly based on US data. (Atkinson, 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on earnings dynamics 
until 1992. Earlier work focused on fitting statistical models to the earnings process. E.g. Lillard 
and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) fitted 
models to the autocovariance structure of earnings and hours, but they did not account for the 
changes in the autocovariance structure of earnings over time.  
Later work, Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995; 1998; 2002) used PSID to estimate the permanent and 
transitory components of male earnings and how it evolved over time. In Moffitt and Gottschalk 
(1998), the earnings process was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in 
age  and  a  highly  persistent  serially  correlated  transitory  component,  with  weights  on  these 
components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  the  increase  in  the  cross-sectional  inequality  of 
individual earnings and wage rates in the U.S. between 1969-1991 has been roughly equally 
composed of increases in the variances of the permanent and transitory components of earnings, 9 
 
with little change in earnings mobility rates. Since most of the theoretical explanations for the 
increase in inequality have been aimed at explaining increases in the variance of the permanent 
component of earnings (e.g. increases in the price of skills), they found their result surprising and 
unexpected. Therefore, in their most recent study, Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008), estimated the 
trend in the transitory variance of male earnings using PSID from 1970 to 2004. They found that 
the transitory variance increased substantially in the 1980’s and remained at the same level until 
2004, for both less and more educated workers. Moreover, the transitory variance appears to 
have a strong cyclical component: its increase accounts for between 30 and 65 of the rise in the 
overall inequality, depending on the period.  
Using  the  PSID,  Baker  (1997)  compared  two  competing  specifications  for  the  permanent 
component  of  earnings:  the  “profile  heterogeneity  or  the  random  growth  model”  and  the 
“random walk model”. In spite of the increased popularity of the latter, Baker (1997) proved that 
the profile heterogeneity model provides a better representation of the data. 
Baker and Solon (2003) decomposed the growth in earnings inequality into its persistent and 
transitory components using longitudinal income tax records from Canada. The earnings process 
was fit by a permanent component, modelled as mixed process composed of a random growth 
and a random walk in age and a highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with 
weights  on  these  components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  growth  in  earnings  inequality 
reflects both an increase in the long-run inequality and an increase in earnings instability.  
Up until recently, little work has been carried out in Europe on the dynamic nature of individual 
earnings.  Dickens  (2000)  analysed  the  pattern  of  individual  male  wages  over  time  in  Great 
Britain using the New Earnings Survey (NES) panel data set for the period 1975-1995. This 
study  divided  the  data  into  year  birth  cohorts  and  analysed  the  auto-covariance  structure  of 
hourly and weekly earnings for each cohort. In the tradition of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1998), the 
earnings process was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in age and a 
highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for 
each year. The results showed that about half in the rise of the overall cross-sectional inequality 
can be explained by the rise in the permanent variance and the rest by the rise in the persistent 
transitory component.  
Ramos  (2003)  analysed the dynamic structure of earnings  in  Great  Britain  using the British 
Household Panel Study for the period 1991-1999. The earnings specification followed a similar 
specification with Baker and Solon (2003). Using information on monthly earnings of male full-
time employees, this study decomposed the covariance structure of earnings into its permanent 
and transitory components and concluded that the increase in inequality over the 1990’s was due 
to  increased  in  earnings  volatility.  Moreover,  the  relative  earnings  persistent  was  found  to 
decline over the lifecycle, which implies a lower mobility for younger cohorts. These findings 
are at odds with previous literature on earnings dynamics both for Great Britain and the OECD. 
Unlike previous literature, this study accounted also for the effect of observed characteristics and 
found that human capital and job related characteristics account for nearly all persistent earnings 
differences and that the transitory component is highly persistent. 
Kalwij and Alessie (2003) examined the variance-covariance structure of log-wages over time 
and over the lifecycle of British men from 1975 to 2001, controlling cohort effects. Their model 10 
 
follows closely the specification used by Abowd and Card (1989), Dickens (2000) and Baker and 
Solon (2003) accounting also for cohort effects. They showed that the increase in the cross-
sectional inequality was caused mainly by the increase in the transitory component of earnings 
and to a lesser extent by an increase in the permanent wage inequality. Thus the increase in 
cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an increase in earnings mobility.  
Cappellari (2003) used the Italian National Social Security Institute for the period 1979-1995 and 
decomposed  the  male  earnings  autocovariance  structure  into  its  long-term  and  transitory 
components using a model specification similar with Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and Backer 
(1997). The model included a permanent component, modelled as a random growth in age and a 
highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for 
each  year  and  cohort.  The  findings  showed  that  growth  was  determined  by  the  long-term 
earnings component. Other evidence on the contribution of permanent and transitory earnings 
components  to  cross-sectional  inequality  has  become  available  in  recent  year  in  Sweden 
(Gustavson, 2004). 
3.  DATA 
The study is  conducted using the European Community Household  Panel  (ECHP)
1 over the 
period 1994-2001 for 14 EU countries. Not all countries are present for all waves. Luxembourg 
and Austria are observed over a period of 7 waves (1995 -2001) and Finland over a period of 6 
waves (1996-2001). Following the tradition of previous studies, the analysis focuses  only on 
men. 
A special problem with panel data is that of attrition over time, as individuals are lost at 
successive  dates  causing  th e  panel  to  decline  in  size  and  raising  the  problem  of 
representativeness. Several papers analysed the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in 
ECHP. A. Behr, E. Bellgardt, U. Rendtel (2005) found that the extent and the determinants of 
panel attrition vary between countries and across waves within one country, but these differences 
do not bias the analysis of income or the ranking of the national results. L.Ayala, C. Navrro, 
M.Sastre (2006) assessed the effects of panel attrition on income mobility comparisons for some 
EU countries from ECHP. The results show that ECHP attrition is characterized by a certain 
degree of selectivity, but only affecting some variables and some countries. Moreover, the 
income mobility indicators show certain sensitivity to the weighting system.  
In  this  paper,  the  weighting  system  applied  to  correct  for  the  attrition  bias  is  the  one 
recommended by Eurostat, namely using the “base weights” of the last wave observed for each 
individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10. The dataset is scaled up to a multiplicative constant
2 
of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual. 
For the empirical analysis, individuals are categorized into four birth cohorts, which are followed 
through time. Ideally, one should use birth cohorts formed from people born in a particular year. 
                                                           
1 The European Community Household Panel provided by Eurostat via the Department of Applied Economics at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
2 The multiplicative constant equals e.g. p*(Population above 16/Sample Population). The ratio p varies across 
countries so that sensible samples are obtained. It ranges between 0.001-0.01. 11 
 
The limited number of observations forces us to group more birth years in one birth cohort. The 
first birth cohort are people born between 1940 and 1950, the second one people born between 
1951-1960, the third cohort people born between 1961 and 1970 and lastly people born between 
1971-1981. This grouping allows the analysis of the earnings covariance structure for individuals 
of the same age, followed at different points in time.  
For this study we use real log hourly wage adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 57, born 
between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher 
than  1  Euro  were  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  resulting  sample  for  each  country  is  an 
unbalanced panel. The choice of using unbalanced panels for estimating the covariance structure 
of  earnings  is  motivated  by  the  need  to  mitigate  the  potential  overestimation  of  earnings 
persistence that would arise from balanced panels where the estimation is based only on people 
that have positive earnings for the entire sample period. Details on the number of observations, 
inflows and outflows of the sample by cohort over time for each country are provided in Table 1 
to Table 14 in the Annex 8.4.  
4.  THE DYNAMIC AUTOCOVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF HOURLY EARNINGS 
To begin with, it is informative to have a description of the dynamic structure of individual log 
hourly earnings for all 14 countries under analysis. The autocovariance structure of earnings is 
computed for each cohort separately, as well as overall. The overall autocovariance structure of 
earnings is displayed in Figure 1, whereas the structure by cohort is included in Annex 8.4, 
Figure 2. Based on these trends we will establish the main characteristics of the model aimed to 
fit the autocovariance structure of earnings for all cohorts and formulate main expectations. 
The overall autocovariance structure of earnings displays both similar and diverging patterns 
across countries. In the beginning of the sample period, the overall inequality appears to be the 
highest in Portugal, followed by Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, UK, Greece, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. In 2001, Portugal still records the 
highest  inequality,  followed  by  Luxembourg,  France,  Greece,  Spain,  UK,  Italy,  Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Austria and Denmark.  
The general picture is that the variance of log hourly earnings appears to decrease over the 
sample  period  in  Germany,  Denmark,  Belgium,  France,  UK,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Austria,  to 
increase in Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal and Finland. The purpose of this paper is 
to decompose the variance for each country into the permanent and transitory variance, and 
conclude which of these components were the main factor triggering the evolution of overall 
inequality over time.  
The common pattern across all countries is that all lags autocovariances show in general similar 
pattern as the variance. They are positive and quite large in magnitude relative to the variances. 
The distance between autocovariances at consecutive lags falls at a decreasing rate. The biggest 
fall is registered by the lag-1 autocovariance, after which the covariances appear to converge 
gradually at a positive level. Variances reflect both the permanent and the transitory components 
of earnings,  whereas  higher order covariances  reflect  the permanent  component of earnings. 
Therefore, the evolution of the covariances, at all orders, suggests the presence of a permanent 12 
 
individual  component  of  wages  and  a  transitory  component  which  is  serially  correlated. 
Moreover, the sharp decline of the first lag autocovariance is consistent with the presence of a 
moving average process of first order.  
Both mean earnings and all lags autocovariances vary over time, which provides a first sign 
suggesting the presence of nonstationarity in the dynamic structure of earnings. 
In all countries,  the autocovariances  display different  patterns across cohorts, supporting the 
hypothesis of cohort heterogeneity with respect to individual earnings dynamics. The general 
picture is that, in all countries, the variance for all cohorts appears to follow the evolution of the 
overall variance, but  the evolution  is  not monotonous and the rate of change differs among 
cohorts. In general, in countries that record a decrease in the variance, the older the cohort, the 
steeper the decrease. For those that record an increase in the variance over time, the older the 
cohort,  the  steeper  the  increase  is.  Moreover,  the  younger  the  cohort  is  the  lower  the 
autocovariances  are.  Hence,  given  that  higher  order  autocovariances  capture  the  permanent 
component of earnings, it is reasonable to expect that in all countries, for younger cohorts, the 
transitory variance plays a larger role in the earnings formation than the permanent component 
compared with older cohorts.  
 
Figure 1. Overall Autocovariance Structure of Hourly Earnings: Years 1994-2001 
For all cohorts, all lags autocovariances show in general similar pattern as the variance, in line 
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a  permanent  individual  component  of  wages  and  a  transitory  component  which  is  serially 
correlated. Moreover, the sharp decline of the first lag autocovariance is consistent with the 
presence of a moving average process of first  order.  Similar with the overall trend, there is 
evidence of nonstationarity in the dynamic structure of earnings by cohort. 
The evolution of the autocovariance structure of earnings provides a first clue with respect to the 
contribution  of  the  permanent  and  transitory  inequality  to  the  overall  inequality.  Given  that 
higher order autocovariances capture mainly permanent differentials, the transitory variance can 
be  approximated  by  the  difference  between  the  variance  and  high  order  autocovariances. 
Therefore we can build some hypothesis regarding the evolution of the two components across 
the 14 EU countries. First, the relative contribution of high order covariances appears to be very 
high (more than roughly  50%) in Germany, Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland, 
Italy,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Austria,  suggesting  that  in  these  countries  the  inequality  in  the 
permanent  component  of  earnings  accounts  for  more  than  50%  from  the  overall  inequality. 
Therefore these countries are expected to exhibit a high persistency in earnings inequality due to 
enhanced  relative  labour  market  advantage  of  high  skill  workers,  strong  wage  setting 
mechanisms and strict EPL.  
Second, among the countries that record a decrease in the variance of earning inequality, we 
expect a decrease in the permanent inequality and an increase in the transitory inequality in 
Germany,  Spain  and  Belgium,  implying  also  an  increase  in  mobility.  A  decrease  in  both 
components is expected in Denmark with unexpected results on mobility, whereas in France, 
UK, Ireland and Austria we expect an increase in the permanent component and a decrease in the 
transitory component, which implies a decrease in mobility. For the countries that recorded an 
increase in the overall inequality over the sample period we expect this to be the result of an 
increase in both the permanent and transitory inequality in Netherlands with unknown effects on 
mobility, of an increase in the permanent inequality and decrease in the transitory inequality in 
Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Finland, with a negative effect on mobility.  
To look at these lifecycle effects more clearly, it is necessary to remove the time effect that is 
present in these within cohort autocovariances. The figures illustrating lifecycle autocovariances 
can be provided upon request from the authors. In all countries, all lags autocovariances of log 
real gross hourly earnings show a similar pattern as the variance. They are positive and evolve 
parallel with the variance, at different rates over the life cycle. They rise sharply over the life 
cycle until the late 30s and early 40s, after which they have a rather stable evolution up until late 
50s, when more noise can be observed in the variance-covariance structure. The diminishing rate 
of increase of all lags autocovariances, which characterizes the life cycle from the age of 20 until 
the late 50s, is consistent with the presence of a permanent component of earnings that rises with 
age  at  a  diminishing  rate.  (Dickens,  2000)  Moreover,  the  autocovariances  display  a  noisy 
evolution over the lifecycle which increases with age, which might suggest also the presence of a 
random walk in age.  
Comparing  across  years,  the  life  cycle  profile  of  the  auto-covariances  of  log  gross  hourly 
earnings appears to become steeper over time in France, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Finland. The slope of the life cycle profile can be interpreted as the returns to the 
permanent component of earnings, therefore steeper slopes in later years imply increasing returns 
to the permanent component of earnings over time. 14 
 
To sum up, the description of the dynamic structure of individual earnings for men suggests five 
main features  of the data. First,  the covariance elements  are not  the same at all lags.  They 
decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate and converge gradually at a positive level, suggesting 
the presence of a transitory element which is serially correlated and of a permanent individual 
component of earnings. The most popular specification for the serially correlated term is the 
AR(1) process. However, the fact that the lag-1 autocovariance drops to a larger extent compared 
with the other autocovariances and that the autocovariances at high orders decline very slowly 
suggest  that  earnings  cannot  be  modelled  simply  as  a  first-order  autoregressive  process. 
Therefore a more complex ARMA (p, q) process might be a better choice, where p represents the 
order of the autoregressive process and q the order of the moving average process. Second, as the 
autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, they cannot be assumed to be 
stationary over sample period. The stationarity assumption was tested and rejected using the 
methodology introduced by MaCurdy (1982). One way to capture this feature is to incorporate 
period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent individual component and the transitory 
component of earnings are allowed to vary with time. Third, as autocovariances vary with age 
controlling for the period effect, they cannot be assumed to be stationary over the life cycle. This 
non-stationarity can be captured by modelling the permanent individual component as random 
walk and/or random growth in age. Lastly, the variance covariance structure appears to be cohort 
specific,  which  can  be  incorporate  by  parameters  that  allow  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components to vary between cohorts.  
5.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURES  
After having presented the trends in the individual male earnings across 14 EU countries, the aim 
of this section is to fit a parsimonious model to the autocovariance structure of earnings for all 
cohorts and for all countries. This model can be use to analyse the changes in the permanent and 
transitory components of earnings over the sample period and their impact on the overall level of 
earnings inequality. 
This section is structured as follows. The first part provides an overview of some parsimonious 
error  component  models  exiting  in  the  literature.  The  second  one  explains  the  econometric 
specification for the earnings model. The third part introduces the specification of the covariance 
structure of earnings residuals and the equally weighted minimum distance method used to fit the 
model to the covariance structure for each cohort. Finally, the estimation results are presented. 
5.1. Econometric Earnings Specification 
In  order  to  differentiate  lifecycle  dynamics  from  secular  changes  in  earnings  inequality,  the 
earnings differentials are analysed within the four cohorts defined in the previous section. The 
first step is to de-trend earnings for each cohort. The empirical specification of earnings follows 
the structure:  
, 1,..., , 1,..., ict ct ict i c Y Y r t T i N       (8) 15 
 
where  ict Y  is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the ??th individual, from the cth 
cohort  in  the  ??th  year,  ct Y is  the  year-cohort  specific  mean  and  ict r   is  an  error  term  which 
represents the individual-specific deviation from the year-cohort specific mean. The demeaned 
earnings  ict r  are assumed to be independently distributed across individuals, but autocorrelated 
over  time.  Earnings  differentials  within  each  cohort  can  be  characterised  by  modelling  the 
covariance structure of individual earnings  0 ( ) ( , ), 0,..., ict ict ict s c c VarCov Y E r r s T t     .
3 
This  study  approaches  the  problem  of  choosing  a  longitudinal  process  for  the  demeaned 
earnings, ict r  following the methodology used by MaCurdy(1981) and MaCurdy (1982), meaning 
in a similar manner with time series. The inspection of the covariance structure of demeaned 
earnings suggested the following features of the data: (i) the elements  of the autocovariance 
structure decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate and (ii) they converge gradually at a positive 
level;  (iii)  the  lag-1  autocovariance  drops  to  a  larger  extent  compared  with higher  order 
autocovariances, which decline more gradually; (iv) the autocovariances and mean earnings vary 
over the sample period, so they cannot be assumed to be stationary over sample period; (v) the 
autocovariances vary with age controlling for the period effect, hence they cannot be assumed to 
be stationary over the life cycle;  (vi) the variance covariance structure  appears to  be cohort 
specific. 
Each of these features are incorporated in our model. Feature (i) suggests the presence of an 
AR(1)  process,  but  the  presence  of  feature  (iii)  calls  for  a  more  complex  ARMA  (1,  1)  or 
ARMA(1, 2) process. Feature (ii) can be captured by the presence of the permanent component. 
Feature (vi) is captured by incorporating period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent 
individual component and the transitory component of earnings are allowed to vary with time. 
The life cycle non-stationarity of the autocovariance structure of earnings mentioned in feature 
(v) can be captured by modelling the permanent individual component as random walk and/or 
random  growth  in  age.  Cohort  heterogeneity  is  incorporate  by  parameters  that  allow  the 
permanent and transitory components to vary between cohorts. 
The idea is to start with a broad class of models for  ict r  and employ preliminary data analysis 
procedures to choose among competing specifications. In this way one avoids choosing a model 
specification  that  is  broadly  inconsistent  with  the  data.  The  following  general  specification 
encompasses all the relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above.  
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3  c T and  0c t represent the total number of years and the first year observed for each cohort. 16 
 
Based  on  equation  (9),  earnings  can  be  decomposed  into  a  permanent  component 
11 [] c t i i it iat age u        and  a  transitory  component  22 c t it v  .  The  component  i i it age    
models an individual profile heterogeneity as a function of age, called also a random growth (see 
(Baker 1997), (Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995)), where  i   and  i   are time invariant individual 
intercept  and  slopes  with  variance 
2
   and
2
  . Besides  the  random  vector  of  intercepts  and 
slopes  ( , ) ii  , the parameterization of individual earnings dynamics includes  also a random 
walk  process  (Equation  (10)).  (Moffit  and  Gottschalk (1995),  Baker  and  Solon (2003))  The 
variance of the first period shock (assumed to be at age 20, which is also the lowest age observed 
in  our  dataset)  is  estimated  together  with  the 
2
 
  and  is  considered  part  of  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Equation (11) specifies the transitory component of earnings which evolves as an ARMA(1,1) 
process, where the serial correlation    parameter captures the decreasing rate of decay of the 
covariances with the lag, the moving-average parameter   captures the sharp drop of the lag-1 
autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances, and  it   are white-noise mean-reverting 
transitory shocks. The variance 
2
0,c    measures the volatility of shocks at the start of the sample 
period, 
2
    the  volatility  of  shocks  in  subsequent  years  and  ρ  the  persistence  of  shocks. 
Measurement error in this model is captured by this transitory component. 
The non-stationary pattern of earnings is accommodated using time specific loading factors, both 
on the permanent and transitory component of earnings,  , 1,2; 0,7 kt k t   , normalized to 1 in the first 
wave for identification
4. Cohort heterogeneity is accommodated by allowing both the permanent 
and the transitory component to vary with the cohort.  , 1,2 jc j    are cohort loading factor, 
normalized to 1 for the cohort born in 1940-1949 for identification. 
5.2.Specification of the Covariance Structure of Earnings  
When  working  with  ARMA(p,q)  processes  in  the  context  of  panel  data,  MaCurdy  (1981), 
MaCurdy (1982) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underlined the need for a treatment of initial 
conditions
5. As illustrated in equations  (13)  and  (14), the autoregressive process induces a 
recursive structure in the moments: the variance-covariance in year t depends on the transitory 
variance-covariance in year t-1. If one tracks the recursion back to the first sample year for each 
cohort, this raises the question of what is the transitory variance for each cohort in that year. In 
earlier  stage  of  the  literature  on  earnings  dynamics,  it  was  common  to  restrict  the  initial 
transitory variance to be the same for all cohorts. In line, with the most recent literature on 
earnings  dynamics,  our  model  acknowledges  that  earnings  volatility  varies  across  cohorts 
because they illustrate different stages of the lifecycle and have experienced different period 
effects, therefore such a strong assumption is untenable. Following MaCurdy (1981), MaCurdy 
                                                           
41994 refers to t=0 
5 See Macurdy(1982, page 92/93) 
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(1982), we treat the initial transitory variances of the 4 cohorts as 4 additional parameters to be 
estimated.  The  complete  specification  of  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  is  included  in 
Annex 8.1. The covariance structure for the first sample period takes the form: 
2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2cov( ) ( ) ( 20) ( ) 0 ic ic ic i i i i i Var Y E r r E age E age a Var v if t                 (12) 
The covariance structure for subsequent years can be expressed as follows: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
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5.3. Estimation of Covariance Structures 
Covariance  structures  are  models  that  specify  a  structure  for  the  covariance  matrix  of  the 
regression error. They can be used to model structures for error dynamics and measurement 
error.  The  goal  is  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  for  all 
cohorts. This can be used to analyse the changes in the permanent and transitory components of 
earnings over the sample period.  
The parameters of the models are fit to the covariance structure for each cohort using equally 
weighted minimum distance methods of estimation. The methodology used is the same as that 
utilized  by  Cappellari  (2003),  Baker  and  Solon  (2003),  Ramos  (2003),  Kalwij  and  Alessie 
(2003), Dickens  (2000), Baker  (1997), Abowd  and Card  (1989), Cervini  and Ramos  (2006) 
adapted to unbalanced panels. The technical details are included in Annex 5.3.  
6.  RESULTS 
The general specification of the error component model outlined in the previous section that 
encompasses all relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above is fit to the elements of 
the  covariance  matrix  for  all  four  cohorts  pooled  together
6  for each country separately. For  
choosing the best model for each country we follow a general to specific strategy.  The strategy 
used to choose between competing models is included in Annex 8.3. 
                                                           
6 i.e. 144 auto-covariances for countries observed over 8 waves, 122 for those with 7 waves and 84 for those with 6 
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We present only the models that fit data the best for each country. The estimation results are 
illustrated in Table 15, Annex 8.4. Following Dickens (2000), all variances are restricted to be 
positive by estimating the variance equal to the exponent of the parameter. The reported variance 
estimates in Table 15 represent the exponent of the parameter and the reported standard errors 
correspond to the parameter estimates. 
The formulation of the permanent component of earnings differs between countries. In Germany, 
Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Finland it follows a random growth model 
with  time  and  cohort  specific  loading  factors.  The  estimated  coefficients  for  the  permanent 
component  of  earnings  show  that  time-invariant  heterogeneity  and  age-earning  profile 
heterogeneity plays a significant role in the formation of long-term earnings differentials in all 
these countries. Individual specific heterogeneity plays the highest role in Germany, followed by 
Spain, Netherlands, Greece, UK, Ireland and Italy, which suggests that in Germany there is a 
higher  dispersion  in  the  time-invariant  individual  specific  attributes  that  determine  wage 
differentials. 
The  estimated  random  slope  variance  implies  that  hourly  earnings  growth  for  an  individual 
located one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of φ is the largest in Germany, 
where it is with 4.89%
7 faster than the cohort mean, followed by Greece, Spain, Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK and Finland with rates between 1% and 1.41% and Italy with 0.89%. All these 
countries have a negative covariance between the time invariant individual specific effect and the 
individual specific slope of the age-earning profile, which implies that the initial and lifecycle 
heterogeneity are negatively associated. This negative association  corresponds to the trade-off 
between earnings early in the career and subsequent earnings growth  and is consistent with the 
on-the-job training hypothesis (Mincer, 1974). Therefore, this suggests the presence of mobility 
within the distribution of permanent earnings over the sample period.  These findings reinforce 
the results from previous studies.  
Therefore for these countries the evolution of the permanent component without the time loading 
factors  could be either increasing or decreasing.  The time-specific loading  factors  for the 
permanent component are highly significant with values close to 1 in all countries. The trends of 
the returns to the permanent component vary to a large e xtent across countries. One common 
feature is that they reflect, as was emphasized before, trends in the high-order autocovariances in 
the data. These estimates show that overall, controlling for age and cohort effects, the returns to 
skills decreased over the sample period in Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain  and 
increased in Germany and Finland. The trends over one year intervals differ between countries, 
some  records  a  smooth  evolution,  others  noisier.  For  example,  Netherlands  experienced 
decreases in returns almost every second year. In UK, the returns increased in 1997 and 2001 and 
decreased in the rest. Ireland recorded more noise in the first half of the period and a clear 
decline after 1997. In Italy, 1998 and 1999 appear to be years with increases in return to skills, in 
Greece every second year, in Spain 1996 and 1998 . Germany experienced increasing returns to 
human capital until 2000, and Finland in 1997 and 2001. Therefore, in these years, the relative 
position of the highly skilled individuals was enhanced.  
                                                           
7 
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In Denmark, France and Portugal the permanent component follows a random walk in age. The 
variance  of  the  innovation  in  the  random  walk  is  significantly  larger  than  zero  in  all  these 
countries. As the variance of a variable that follows a random walk is the sum of the variances of 
the innovation term, this finding implies that permanent inequality increases over lifetime. In 
Denmark, the variance at the age of 20 is higher than the variance at subsequent ages, suggesting 
the presence of larger permanent shocks at younger ages, which is consistent matching models, 
in which the information revealed about a worker’s ability increases with time. In France and 
Portugal, the variance of the initial shock at the age of 20 does not play a significant role in the 
formation of the permanent component of earnings. The variance of the innovation term is the 
highest in Portugal, followed by France and Denmark, which suggests that in Portugal there is a 
higher  variety  of  earnings  shocks  that  change  the  ranking  of  individuals  in  the  permanent 
component of earnings. The final trend in the permanent variance depends on the period specific 
loading factors, which reveal that overall, the relative position of the highly skilled individuals 
decreased over the sample period in Denmark, and France, and increased Portugal. The year to 
year evolution was smooth in Denmark, where they decreased until 2000 and in France, which 
experienced increasing returns to skills before 1997 and decreasing thereafter. In Portugal, the 
loading factors decreased every second year.  
In Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria the persistent dispersion of earnings follows the canonical 
model,  where  the  permanent  component  is  time-invariant.  The  highest  variance  in  the  time 
invariant characteristics is recorded in Luxembourg, followed by Austria and Belgium. In this 
case, the time-specific loading factors determine the final trend of the permanent differentials: 
they decreased in Belgium and Austria, and increased in Luxembourg. With respect to the yearly 
evolution, Luxembourg records an increase in the return to skills until 2000, Belgium in 1995 
and 2001, and Austria during most of the period except 1998-1999. 
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the permanent earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. However, the trends suggested by these estimates differ between countries. The 
permanent  component  of  earnings  appears  to  increase  over  the  life  cycle  in  Germany, 
Luxembourg and Austria. In Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal the permanent 
component  of  earnings  has  an  inverted-U  shape  evolution  over  the  life  cycle.  These  trends 
confirm  the expectation  that permanent  earnings  differentials  play a much larger role in  the 
formation of overall earnings differentials of older cohorts compared with younger ones, which 
experience higher earnings volatility due to temporary contracts. We expect the opposite to hold 
in the case of cohort-specific shifters for the temporary earnings.  
The permanent component of earnings appears to decrease over the life cycle in France, UK, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Finland. One possible explanation is that younger cohorts have more 
heterogeneous  skills.  Another  explanation  is  that  younger  cohorts  might  experience  larger 
permanent shocks even if they do not have a larger dispersion of skills. This could be the case if 
the labour market has become tougher over time, such as in the case of the Italian labour market, 
which is characterised by high rates of youth unemployment.  
The formulation of the temporary component of earnings differs between countries. It follows an 
AR(1) process with time and cohorts loading factors in all countries, except for Italy, Greece and 
Spain, where it follows an ARMA(1,1). Except for Ireland, Spain and Austria, where all cohorts 
share the same initial conditions, the other countries are characterized by heteroskedastic initial 20 
 
conditions.  The  estimated  coefficients  for  the  transitory  component  of  earnings  are  all 
significant,  suggesting  that  the  initial  variance(s),  the  AR(1)  process,  respectively  the 
ARMA(1,1) process and the time and cohort loading factors contribute significantly to earnings 
volatility in all countries.  
The variance of initial conditions, which represents the accumulation of shocks up to the starting 
year of the panel, is smaller than that of subsequent shocks in all countries. However, the pattern 
of the heteroskedstic initial conditions differs between countries. In Denmark, Luxembourg, UK 
Italy, Portugal and Finland it follows the inverted-U shape: the variance of initial conditions 
increases  over  the  lifecycle  and  decreases  at  the  end.  In  Germany,  Netherlands,  France  and 
Finland the pattern of the heteroskedstic initial conditions illustrates a general decreasing trend 
over the lifecycle, suggesting that the initial variance plays a larger role in the formation of 
earnings differentials for the youngest cohort compared with the oldest. In Belgium the reverse 
holds: the heteroskedastic cohort initial conditions appear to play the largest role in the formation 
of earnings differentials for the oldest cohort and the smallest for the youngest cohort. 
The magnitude of the autoregressive parameter varies between countries. A large autoregressive 
parameter, which suggests that shocks are persistent, is recorded in Spain with 26.9% of a shock 
still present after 8 years, in Portugal with 8.5% and in Austria with 5.7%. These are countries 
where the wage-setting mechanisms and EPL were not strong enough to reduce the impact of 
shock  earnings.  A  moderate  autoregressive  parameter  suggesting  that  shocks  die  out  rather 
quickly is recorded in Italy with 2.8% of a shock still present after 8 years, in Belgium with 
2.4%,  and  in  Greece  with  1.4%.  A  very  small  autoregressive  parameter  is  present  in 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, Germany, France, UK and Denmark, where between 
0.0008%  and  0.8%  of  a  shock  is  still  present  after  8  years.  The  negative  sign  of  the  MA 
component implies that the autocovariances decline sharply over the first period, confirming the 
trends observed in the previous section, for Italy, Greece and Spain.
8 
The time-specific loading factors for the transitory component are highly significant and display 
a higher variation than for the permanent component in all countries. The trends of the transitory 
inequality vary to a large extent across countries. These estimates show that overall the transitory 
variance decreased over the sample period in Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
UK, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland. It increased in Luxembourg and Ireland.  
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the transitory earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the temporary component indicate 
that earnings volatility appears to be higher  for younger cohorts, thus confirming the pattern 
observed  in  the  dynamic  description  of  the  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings ,  where 
autocovariances were found to be lower for younger cohorts. This result is expected, given that 
younger people experience in general more frequent job changes, and consequently  less stable 
earnings.  
                                                           
8 For the other countries, the MA component was either rejected by the data or could not be identified due to the low 
number of waves.  
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Having estimated a suitable error component model for earnings in each of the EU countries 
under analysis, next the purpose is to use these parameters estimates to decompose the variance-
covariance  structure  of  earnings  into  its  permanent  and  transitory  components,  assess  their 
relative importance and analyse their contribution to the evolution of the overall inequality over 
the sample period. In other words, the aim is to understand the extent to which changes in the 
distribution of lifetime earnings and transitory fluctuations contribute to the evolution of cross-
sectional differentials. Basically, we want to assess which is the component that plays the largest 
role in the declining/rising overall cross-sectional inequality between 1994 and 2001.  
The decomposition of the variance, together with the actual and predicted variance of earnings 
by cohort are presented in Figure 3. A summary of the evolution of the two components is 
offered  in  Figure  4  which  illustrates  the  ratio  between  the  average  across  cohorts  of  the 
permanent  variance  and  the  transitory  variance.  Finally,  Figure  5  illustrates  the  relative 
decomposition of the overall predicted variance of earnings into its permanent and transitory 
components. The main findings for these figures are summarized below. 
For all countries, the evolution of the predicted variance follows closely the evolution of the 
actual variance, which is not surprising given the high fit of the models indicated by the very low 
sum of square residuals. Earnings inequality measured by the actual variance decreased overall 
in Germany except for the cohorts born in 1941-1950 and 1961-1970 where it increased, in 
Denmark, in Belgium except for the youngest cohort where it increased, in France except for the 
cohort born in 1961-1970, in UK except for the youngest two cohorts where it increased, in 
Ireland, in Spain except the youngest cohort and in Austria. Earnings inequality measured by the 
actual  variance  increased  overall  for  all  cohorts  in  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Greece, 
Portugal and Finland except the youngest cohort, which are countries where wages are more 
responsive to market forces.  
The  highest  permanent  inequality  is  recorded  in  Portugal,  Spain,  Germany,  France  and 
Luxembourg, which record also a low to moderate level of trade union density, a high level of 
collective bargaining coverage, a high level of centralization/co-ordination and a strict EPL. At 
the  other  end,  the  lowest  permanent  inequality  is  observed  in  Finland  and  Denmark.  These 
countries  exhibit  a  high  trade  union  density,  a  high  level  of  collective  bargaining,  a  high 
centralization/co-ordination and a low to medium strictness of the EPL. Hence it appears that the 
stricter the EPL and the lower the trade union density is, the higher is the inequality in the 
permanent component of earnings. 
The  pattern  of  decomposition  of  the  overall  variance  varies  between  cohorts  and  countries. 
Inequality in the permanent component of earnings appears to account for a higher share of the 
overall  variance  the  older  the  cohort  is,  which  is  consistent  with  the  evidence  of  lifecycle 
earnings divergence showing that older cohorts experience a lower earnings volatility compared 
with younger cohorts. Moreover, inequality in the temporary component of earnings accounts for 
the  highest  share  for  the  youngest  cohort,  which  reinforces  the  expectation  that  earnings 
volatility is higher at younger ages. This pattern is valid for most countries. 
The decrease in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by a decrease in the importance of 
the permanent component relative to the transitory component, and consequently an increase in 
mobility in Denmark, Belgium and Spain. Wage immobility appears to be higher in Spain than in 22 
 
Belgium and Denmark. This is consistent with the fact that Spain is characterised by a degree of 
permanent inequality, which is more than twice the value for the other two countries, and a 
higher share of the permanent component.  
In Denmark, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality appears to be the result of decreasing both 
permanent and transitory differentials. Permanent differentials reduced to a higher extent than 
temporary differentials; therefore we can conclude that mobility helped individuals to change 
their  position  in  the  income  distribution  by  reducing  permanent  differentials.  Moreover,  the 
structure of inequality was affected the most for older cohorts, which recorded a larger noise 
over time. But overall, in 2001 the structure of inequality did not change much compared with 
1994. In 2001, for the oldest two cohorts the persistent variance accounts for roughly 50%-60% 
of the overall variance, for the cohort born between 1961-1970 40%, whereas for the youngest 
cohort the variance is mostly transitory (90%).  
The decrease in the transitory component might signal the presence of strong wage bargaining 
structures. This is supported by OECD (2004) findings: among all 14 EU countries, Denmark has 
one of the higher collective bargaining and trade union density. Moreover it was among the only 
ones, together with Belgium and Finland, which recorded an increase in trade union density. The 
outstanding performance of the labour market in Denmark which assured a decreasing cross-
sectional inequality by a reduction in both components, might be due to the so called “flexicurity 
approach” (OECD(2004)), which represents an interesting combination of high labour market 
dynamism and relatively high social protection. This is the combination of flexibility (a high 
degree of job mobility thanks to low EPL), social security (a generous system of unemployment 
benefits)  and  active  labour  market  programmes,  which  allows  individuals  to  improve  their 
position  in  the  permanent  income  distribution  by  reducing  permanent  income  differentials, 
maintain at the same time a low degree of earnings volatility.  
In Belgium and Spain, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality appears to be determined by a 
decrease  in  the  permanent  variance  and  an  increase  in  the  transitory  variance.  Permanent 
differentials reduced to a larger extent compared with the increase in the transitory inequality, 
which lowered overall inequality. This suggests the presence of increasing wage mobility which 
allowed individuals to improve their position in the permanent income distribution. In Belgium, 
the structure of inequality did not change much in 2001 compared with 1994, whereas for Spain 
we observe a clear increase in the share of the transitory component. In Belgium, the rates are 
similar with Denmark for the oldest two cohorts and higher with roughly 10 percentage points 
for the rest. In Spain, the share of the permanent component is higher with roughly 10 percentage 
points for the oldest two cohorts and with roughly 20 percentage points for the youngest two than 
in Belgium.  
The puzzling thing is that, Belgium, despite the fact that recorded an increase in trade union 
density and a stable collective bargaining coverage, its transitory inequality recorded an increase 
over  the  sample  period.  Moreover,  Belgium  records  one  of  the  highest  strictness  of  the 
employment protection legislation among all OECD countries, which has not decreased over the 
sample period. However, one labour market factor that could have contributed to the increase in 
the transitory variance is the decrease in the degree of centralization from relatively centralized 
to intermediate. Spain has a stricter employment protection legislation than Belgium, but the 
decrease in trade union density and centralization/co-operation coupled with the stable evolution 23 
 
of the collective bargaining coverage might explain the increase in transitory inequality. Yet 
another factor that can be linked with the increase in the transitory variance, both in Spain and 
Belgium, is an important recent innovation in European labour markets: temporary job contracts. 
This type of contract allows employees to be hired without the previous restrictions imposed by 
the regulations against firing, therefore allowing for a higher mobility in the labour market and 
implicitly in wages. Finally, the increased immigration might be a contributing factor.  
In Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality was 
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  importance  of  the  permanent  component  relative  to  the 
transitory  component,  and  therefore  a  decrease  in  earnings  mobility.  Therefore,  in  these 
countries, mobility cannot be considered the driving force for the decrease in overall inequality. 
Wage  immobility  appears  to  be  the  highest  in  Ireland  and  Germany.  The  highest  persistent 
inequality is recoded in France, Germany and Ireland, which also record among the highest 
shares of the permanent inequality.  
In Germany the trends differ a lot between cohorts: the oldest and the second youngest cohorts 
are  characterised  by  increasing  permanent  and  transitory  differentials,  the  second  oldest  by 
decreasing permanent and transitory differentials and the youngest by decreasing transitory and 
increasing  permanent  differentials.  The  same  for  the  structure  of  inequality:  the  share  of 
permanent earnings inequality in the overall inequality had an overall decreasing trend for the 
oldest cohort, a rather constant trend for the second oldest cohort and an increasing trend for the 
youngest two cohorts. Controlling for the cohort effect, Germany records an increasing trend in 
the permanent differentials and a decreasing trend in the transitory differentials.  In 2001, in 
Germany compared with Spain, the share of the permanent component for the oldest two cohorts 
is higher with roughly 10 percentage points, roughly equal for the second youngest cohort and 
higher with 10 percentage points for the youngest. Therefore, in Germany, the persistency of 
earnings is higher than in Spain, and implicitly than in Belgium and Denmark. This result is not 
surprising given the high level of strictness in the employment protection legislation, which did 
not change much over time, and the low level of labour market dynamics. The different trends 
observed between cohorts might be due to the difference in regulating temporary and permanent 
employment.  Germany  is  among  the  countries  with  the  strictest  regulation  for  temporary 
employment, which might affect new entrants in the labour market. This might be an explanation 
for  the  increasing  share  in  the  permanent  inequality  for  the  youngest  cohorts.  For  regular 
contracts,  Germany  does  not  have  particularly  stringent  provisions.  Trade  union  density 
decreased, collective bargaining coverage increased and. centralisation/co-operation decreased. 
In France, the decrease in the overall variance was determined by decreasing transitory and 
increasing permanent inequality. Transitory variance reduced to a larger extent compared with 
the increase in the permanent variance, which suggests a decrease in earnings mobility. The 
structure of inequality modified to a large extent and is characterised by increasing shares of the 
permanent component of earnings. In 2001, the share of the persistent component is very similar 
with Germany. The increase in the permanent component might signal increasing returns to skills 
over  the  sample  period,  whereas  the  decreasing  transitory  component  might  signal  a  labour 
market mechanism put in place to reduce transitory inequality and prevent overall inequality 
from rising. The level of strictness in the employment protection legislation is higher than in 
Germany and increased slightly over time. On the one hand this might explain the increase in 
permanent inequality. On the other hand, together with the low level of labour market dynamics, 24 
 
it may explain the reduction in transitory inequality and mobility. Moreover, France ranks the 
lowest on union density (France), but managed to increase coverage levels after the introduction 
of legislation promoting collective bargaining and is now among the countries with the highest 
coverage rates of 90% and above, together with Austria, Belgium and Finland. 
Mixed trends are present also for UK: permanent variance decreased slightly for the oldest and 
youngest  cohort  and  increased  slightly  for  the  other  two  cohorts.  The  transitory  variance 
decreased for all cohorts, except for the youngest one. Therefore, the decreasing trend of the 
overall inequality can be the result of decreasing transitory differentials. This might signal the 
strengthening of the labour market institutions. The structure of inequality changed over time and 
was characterized by an increase in the  the share of the permanent variance for all cohorts, 
except for the youngest one. In 2001, the share of the persistent differentials was similar with 
Spain.  UK  labour  market  is  characterized  by  a  low  strictness  in  the  employment  protection 
legislation, which appears to increase slightly over time, thus explaining the decrease in the 
transitory variance. Other evolution in the labour market are the decrease in trade union density 
and collective coverage bargaining. Centralization/co-operations remained constant at a very low 
level.  
In Ireland, the decreasing trend in cross-sectional inequality appears to be the result of different 
factors  before  and  after  1997.  The  first  half  of  the  sample  period  was  characterised  by  an 
increase  in  the  permanent  earnings  inequality.  This  might  be  the  effect  of  the  remarkable 
economic boom that started in 1994. Moreover, earnings volatility decreased over this period, 
which signals the strengthening of the labour market institutions. The highly centralized nature 
of the wage bargaining in Ireland was the main driving force which kept inequality from rising in 
line  with  the  remarkable  economic  growth.  Between  1997  and  2001  permanent  earnings 
inequality started to decrease slightly. This period coincides with the slowing down of the Celtic 
Tiger.  The  rise  in  earnings  mobility  shows  that  people  move  more  freely  in  the  income 
distribution and manage to reduce the permanent differentials, up to a level that remains still 
higher than in 1994, for all cohorts except the oldest one. However, the overall increase in the 
permanent  differentials  over  the  sample  period  was  counteracted  by  the  wage  bargaining 
structures,  which  managed  to  reduce  to  larger  extent  the  transitory  inequality,  and  bring 
inequality at a lower level in 2001 compared with 1994.  
To conclude about Ireland, the economic growth was a shock that accentuated the permanent 
differentials  between  individuals.  The  labour  market  institutions  managed  to  reduce  the 
transitory  component  of  earnings  to  a  larger  extent  than  the  increase  in  the  permanent 
component, which led to a decrease in the overall wage inequality over the sample period. The 
structure of inequality over the sample period changed to a large extent and led to an increase in 
the share of the permanent component of earnings, increase which was the result of a sharp 
increase over 1994-1997 and a slight decrease thereafter. In 2001, the structure of inequality is 
similar  with  Germany,  except  for  the  youngest  cohort  where  the  share  of  the  permanent 
component is almost double, suggesting a lower earnings volatility for Irish youngsters. This 
might be to the low incidence of temporary contracts on the Irish labour market and the moderate 
strictness of the EPL for permanent contracts, which represents a good incentive for firms to hire 
youngsters with a permanent contract and increase their employability. Other trends that were 
present in the labour market is a slight increase in the overall strictness of the EPL, which is 
consistent with decreasing transitory differentials, a low labour market mobility, consistent with 25 
 
the  decrease  in  earnings  mobility,  a  decrease  in  the  union  density  and  a  trend  towards 
deregulation.  
In Austria the decrease in the overall variance appears to be the result of decreasing permanent 
and transitory differentials. However, something appears to change dramatically after 1998. Until 
1998, the share of the permanent inequality increases sharply and was accompanied by a large 
drop in wage mobility. During 1999, Austria has experienced a considerable rise in employment 
and a further decline in unemployment, which was the effect of the labour market initiatives 
pursued by the Austrian Government. This explains the increase in inequality after 1999: higher 
employment  is  usually  accompanied  by  higher  inequality.  These  measures  appear  to  have 
favoured  earnings  mobility,  which  increased  in  1999  and  remained  constant  thereafter. 
Permanent differentials, both in absolute value and as share of the overall inequality reduced in 
1999  and  remained  constant  through  the  end  of  the  sample  period.  Transitory  differentials 
increased in 1999 and remained constant thereafter, both in absolute value and as a share of the 
overall inequality. After all these developments, in 2001 the level of mobility settled at a level 
below the one from 1994.  
The structure of inequality modified greatly over time, especially before and after 1998. Overall, 
the  share  of  the  permanent  component  increased.  For  the  oldest  three  cohorts  the  structure 
evolved from an equal share of the two components in 1995 to a great increase in the permanent 
component in 1998, then a sharp drop in 1999, followed by a stable evolution thereafter. For the 
youngest cohort, the two components have a apparently converging trend until 1998, followed by 
a divergence thereafter.  In 2001, the permanent  differentials  account  for 60% of the overall 
variance for the oldest three cohorts and for 20% for the youngest one, which indicates Austria 
as  the  country  with  the  lowest  earnings  persistency  among  the  countries  which  recorded  a 
decrease in earning inequality over the sample period.  
For Austria, the trend in inequality after 1998 is as expected given the trends in the labour market 
after  1998:  decrease  in  trade  union  density,  increase  in  collective  bargaining,  which  placed 
Austria  as  the  highest,  a  decrease  in  overall  EPL  to  a  moderate  level  and  consequently  a 
moderate job mobility and moderate labour market performance. Comparing between types of 
contracts, the permanent contracts are more regulated than temporary one, which also recorded a 
decrease and might have pushed more people in temporary employment. This might explain the 
reduction  in  the  permanent  inequality:  because  firms’  reluctance  to  invest  in  training  for 
temporary employees, the returns to human capital are reduced. These trends also explain the 
increase in the temporary variance after 1998.  
The  increase  in  cross-sectional  inequality  was  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  mobility  in 
Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Finland, and by an increase in mobility in Netherlands. 
In 1994, wage mobility was the lowest in Portugal, followed by Italy, Netherlands, Greece and 
Finland whereas in 2004, Italy and Portugal were the least mobile, followed by Finland and 
Greece. As expected, the countries with the lowest mobility are also the ones with the highest 
share of the permanent inequality.  
In general, in Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Finland the increase in the overall cross-sectional 
inequality  appears  to  be  the  result  of  a  combined  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  permanent 
component of earnings and a decrease in the transitory component. For Portugal, both appear to 26 
 
increase.  The  permanent  component  increased  to  a  larger  extent  relative  to  the  transitory 
component, leading to a decrease in earnings mobility. Therefore the increase in cross-sectional 
inequality  was  triggered  mainly  by  an  exacerbation  of  the  permanent  differentials,  meaning 
increasing returns to skills. The structure of inequality changed over time. What can be observed 
is an increase in the incidence of the permanent inequality in the overall inequality for all four 
countries. In 2001, Luxembourg has the highest shares of the permanent component among all 
countries recording an increase in overall inequality: roughly 80% for the oldest three cohorts 
and 40% for the youngest one. Next in line in terms of earnings persistency we find Italy, with 
slightly lower shares for all cohorts. Portugal, the structure in 2001 is very similar with Italy, 
except for the youngest cohort, for which the share is with almost 20% lower, signalling a higher 
earnings volatility for youngsters in Portugal. In Greece, in 2001, the share of the persistent 
component is lower with roughly 10 percentage points for the oldest two cohorts, similar for the 
second youngest cohort and more than double for the youngest cohort than in Portugal. This 
suggests that earnings volatility for the youngest cohort is lower than in Portugal and is similar 
with Luxembourg and Italy. In Finland, the share of the permanent component for the oldest two 
and the youngest cohorts is similar with Greece, whereas for the second youngest the share is 
higher with roughly 10 percentage points than in Greece.  
These trends are consistent with the evolution of the wage-setting and employment protection 
legislation. All these countries recorded a decrease in overall EPL, some from high levels, such 
as Italy, Portugal and Greece, and the rest from moderate levels. Split by type of contract, we can 
observe that, except for Finland, where the EPL for temporary contracts staid constant, the other 
countries recoded a decrease. . In Italy and Greece, the EPL for temporary contracts decreased to 
a much larger extent than for permanent contracts. However EPL for permanent contracts was 
still less strict than for temporary contracts, which might signal that employers prefer to hire with 
permanent  contracts.  This  trend  might  be  an  explanation  the  increase  in  the  permanent 
inequality. On the other hand, the increase in the collective coverage bargaining might be an 
explanation for the decrease in the transitory inequality In Portugal permanent contracts have 
much higher EPL than temporary contracts, which represents an incentive for firms to hire with 
temporary contracts, affecting mainly youth employment. This is consistent with the fact that 
Portugal displays the highest volatility for the youngest cohort. In rest, these three countries 
display similar features of the wage-setting and employment protection legislations: high level of 
EPL accompanied as  expected by low labour market  dynamics  which is  consistent  with the 
decrease in earnings mobility, a decrease in trade union density and in collective bargaining 
coverage and a high level of centralization/co-ordination.  
In Finland, the permanent contract EPL reduced, allowing for a higher employment rate, and 
therefore a higher permanent inequality or a setting for increasing returns to skills. The other 
trends, such as the increase in trade union density and collective bargaining coverage, the very 
high level of centralization, might explain the decrease in transitory inequality.  
In Luxembourg, the approval of the National Action plan for employment in 1998 appears to 
have  affected  the  structure  of  wage  differentials  to  a  large  extent.  This  plan  was  aimed  to 
increase  the  employment  of  young,  older  workers  and  women.  This  was  accomplished  by 
training and activation policies, aimed to increase their employability. Immediately after 1998, 
transitory inequality started to increase, exacerbating already increasing permanent differentials. 
This is not surprising, given that these activation policies were aimed to increase human capital 27 
 
for these low-wage categories and include them in the active labour market, thus increasing 
permanent differentials.  
In Netherlands, transitory inequality was exacerbated over the time for all cohorts, whereas the 
trends in the permanent inequality differ to a large extent between cohorts. Overall, mobility 
appears  to  increase.  But  in  this  case,  mobility  actually  exacerbates  overall  cross-sectional 
inequality, suggesting an increase in the earnings volatility. This conclusion is supported also by 
the evolution in the structure of inequality, which illustrates that the share of the permanent 
inequality decreased over time. In 2001, the share of the permanent components is the lowest 
among all countries recording an increase in overall inequality. These trends could be triggered 
by the evolution of EPL. Netherlands is characterized by a moderate EPL, which did not change 
over time. The same holds if we look by type of contract. However, the permanent employment 
had a higher EPL than temporary employment, which represents an incentive for hiring people 
with low employability. This might explain the increase in the transitory inequality. The increase 
in permanent inequality might be explained by the high level of collective bargaining coverage 
which increased over time. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As mentioned in the starting section, the purpose of this study was to analyze what are the 
driving forces behind the changes in the distribution of labour market income across 14 EU 
countries  over  the  period  1994-2001  using  ECHP.  Earnings  inequality,  as  measured  by  the 
variance in log earnings was found to decrease in Germany, Denmark, Belgium, France, UK, 
Ireland, Spain, Austria and to increase in Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Finland.  We  examined  the  extent  to  which  these  changes  in  cross-sectional  inequality  were 
determined mainly by changes in the transitory or in the permanent component of individual 
earnings.  
In line with the conclusions from Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) and OECD (2004), the most 
notable change after 1995 in Europe has been increased country heterogeneity, which translated 
itself in the level and evolution of the cross-sectional earnings inequality components. However, 
some common trends can be identified. For all countries individual earnings inequality contains a 
highly permanent component for the oldest three cohorts and a highly transitory component for 
the youngest cohort. Regarding the structure of inequality, the permanent component appears to 
account for a higher share of the overall variance the older the cohort is, which is consistent with 
the evidence of lifecycle earnings divergence showing that older cohorts experience a lower 
earnings  volatility  compared  with  younger  cohorts.  Moreover,  inequality  in  the  temporary 
component of earnings accounts for the highest share for the youngest cohort, which reinforces 
the expectation that earnings volatility is higher at younger ages.  
The  highest  permanent  inequality  is  observed  in  Portugal,  Spain,  Greece,  Germany,  France, 
Luxembourg which are also the countries with strict EPL and a low trade union density. The 
lowest permanent inequality is observed in Finland and Denmark, which have higher trade union 
density and less strict EPL. So it appears that the higher the trade union density and the stricter 
the EPL are, the higher is the permanent earnings inequality.  28 
 
The decrease in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an increase in mobility in, an 
therefore a decrease in the importance of the permanent component relative to the transitory 
component in Denmark, Belgium and Spain. In Denmark it was triggered by a decrease in both 
inequality components, whereas in Belgium and Spain by a decrease in the permanent variance 
and an increase in earnings volatility. Overall, income persistency appears to be higher in Spain, 
followed by Belgium and Denmark. For Denmark, this evolution might be the outcome of the 
“fexicurity approach” a assured by a low EPL), generous unemployment benefits and active 
labour  market  programmes.  In  Spain  and  Belgium,  the  overall  trend  can  be  linked  to  the 
increased incidence of temporary job contracts.  
In Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality was 
accompanied by a decrease in earnings mobility, meaning an increase in the importance of the 
permanent component relative to the transitory component. This was the result of mixed trends 
in Germany, of decreasing transitory and increasing permanent inequality in France and Ireland, 
a decrease in transitory inequality in UK and a decrease in both components in Austria. Germany 
is among the countries  with the strictest regulation for temporary employment, which might 
affect new entrants in the labour market and older workers. This might favour the hiring of the 
younger workers with permanent contracts and also the crowding out of the older workers, with 
offsetting effects on the two components. In France, the level of strictness in the employment 
protection legislation is higher than in Germany and increased slightly over time. Other trend 
that might explain the evolution are the low level of labour market dynamics, the large increase 
collective  bargaining  coverage  which  placed  France  among  the  countries  with  the  highest 
coverage  rates,  together  with  Austria,  Belgium  and  Finland.  In  UK  the  strictness  in  the 
employment protection legislation appears to increase slightly over time, thus explaining the 
decrease in  the transitory  variance.  The highly  centralized nature of the wage bargaining in 
Ireland was the main driving force which kept inequality from rising in line with the remarkable 
economic growth, by reducing transitory inequality to a larger extent than the increase in return 
to skills. Moreover, what is surprising for Ireland is the high level of persistency in earnings for 
the  youngest  cohort,  which  might  be  explained  by  the  moderate  strictness  of  the  EPL  for 
permanent  contracts  which  is  a  good  incentive  for  firms  to  hire  youngsters  with  permanent 
contracts and invest in their training.  In Austria the increase in collective bargaining, which 
placed Austria the highest among all OECD countries, appears to have counteracted the decrease 
in trade union density, the decrease in the strictness EPL and trigger a larger decrease in the 
transitory component compared with the permanent component after 1998.  
The increase in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by a decrease in mobility, meaning 
an increase in the relative importance of the permanent component compared with the transitory 
component in Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Finland, and by an increase in mobility 
in Netherlands This trend appears to be the result of an increase in the permanent component of 
earnings and a decrease in the transitory component. In Italy and Greece, these might have been 
triggered by a decrease in the EPL of permanent contracts compared with temporary contracts, a 
decrease  in  trade  union  density  and  in  collective  bargaining  coverage  and  a  high  level  of 
centralization/co-ordination.  Similar  conditions  hold  for  Portugal,  except  for  the  EPL  for 
temporary contract, which is less strict than the EPL for permanent contracts, and the large drop 
in union density. For Finland, the trend appears to be the result of a decrease in the EPL for 
permanent contracts, an increase in trade union density and collective bargaining coverage and a 
very high level of centralization. In Luxembourg, the activation policies appear to have been the 29 
 
triggering factor. In Netherlands, the increase in the incidence of temporary contracts appears to 
be  the  factor  explaining  the  increase  in  the  relative  importance  of  the  transitory  inequality 
compared with the permanent one.  
However, the links between the evolution of the two inequalities and the evolution of labour 
market is purely descriptive and should be interpreted with caution. I more thorough link could 
be realised using the two components as decomposed by our models in a similar analysis with 
the one conducted by the OECD (2004) report. Another point for further research could be a 
more thorough analysis of the link between earnings mobility and the two inequality components 
using different mobility measures.  
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8.  ANNEX  
8.1.The Specification of the covariance structure of earnings 
The covariance structure for the first sample period takes the form: 
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The  covariance  structure  implied  by  the  model  introduced  in  the  previous  section  takes  the 
following form. The variance of the process can be expressed as follows: 
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8.2.Estimation of Covariance Structures 
For  each  cohort  ?? and  individual  ??,  define  a  vector  which  identifies  the  presence  for  each 


















where  ict d  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the individual from cohort c is present in 
year t of the panel and  c t is the total length of the panel for each cohort. Similarly, the vector 


















where  ict r  are the earnings residuals for individual i belonging to cohort c, in year t in mean 
deviation form for each cohort and year. The elements of the  ic R  corresponding to missing years 
are set to 0. The variance-covariance matrix of the earnings is computed separately for each 
cohort, c C .  The  elements  of  the  variance-covariance  matrix  for  cohort  c,  c C ,  which  is  of 
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where  c n  is the total number of individuals in cohort c,  , {1,..., } c k l t  . Conformably with  c m , 
ci m   represent  the  distinct  elements  of  the  individual  cross-product  matrix 
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  distinct elements. Let  c Vech(C )be a column 





   which  stacks  all  the  elements  of  the  variance  covariance 
matrix  c C   for  cohort  c.  The  aggregate  vector  of  moments  for  all  cohorts  is  denoted  by: 
T T T
14 m=(Vech(C ) ,...,Vech(C ) ) , 











  . In this paper, each cohort is observed 
between 1994 and 2001, therefore  8 c t  . Since the individuals were grouped in four cohorts, m
is a column vector of dimension (144 1)  . 
To estimate the error components of the structural model illustrated by equations (9), (10) and 
(11), the elements of m are fit to a parameter vector θ, so that  () f  m θ ,  () f θ  takes the form 
of equations (13), (14), (15) and (12). Minimum distance estimation requires minimising the 
weighted sum of the squared distance between the actual covariances (m) and a function of the 
parameter  vector  ( () f θ )  which  encapsulates  the  covariance  structure  implied  by  the  error 
component  model.  Therefore,  minimum  distance  estimation  involves  the  following  quadratic 
form: ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]' D f f    θ m θ W m θ ,  where  Wis  a  positive  definite  weighting  matrix. 
Minimum distance estimator chooses   θ  to minimise the distance function   () D θ . 
Based on Chamberlain (1984), the asymptotic optimal choice of  W is the inverse of a matrix 
that consistently estimates the covariance matrix of m, which leads to the optimum minimum 
distance estimator (OMD). However, Clark (1996) and Altonji and Segal (1994) provided Monte 
Carlo evidence that OMD is biased in small samples because of the correlation between the 
measurement error in the second moments and forth moments. Instead, they proposed using the 
identity matrix as a weighting matrix. This approach, often called “equally weighted minimum 
distance estimation” (EWMD), involves using the standard nonlinear least squares to fit  () f θ  to
m. The same procedure is followed in this paper.  
For estimating the asymptotic standard errors of the parameter estimates, we apply the delta 
method.  Following  Chamberlain  (1984),  the  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the 
estimated parameters is obtained from the following formula: 
 
-1 -1 AsyVar(θ)=(G'WG) G'' WVWG(G WG)   (22) 33 
 
where  G is  the  Jacobian  of  the  transformation  () f θ  evaluated  at    θθ .  G has dimension 





  and p is the number of 
parameters. W is the identity matrix and V the matrix of fourth sample moments.  
Chamberlain  (1984)  showed  that  under  some  fairly  general  regularity  assumptions,  the 
independence of  ic R  implies that the sample mean of  ci m  has an asymptotic normal distribution 
** ( , ) c c c m N m V  , where 
*
c m  is the expectation of  ci m , meaning the true covariance matrix of 
earnings,  and 
*
c V  is  the  variance-covariance  matrix,  which  can  be  estimated  consistently  by 
computing the sample moment matrix of the  c Vech(C ) vector,  c V . The elements of the variance 
covariance  c V  can be written as follows: 
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The variance-covariance matrix of m was denoted by  V , where V is the block diagonal matrix 
which is constructed from all the  c V  matrices.  
8.3. Strategy for model specification 
The chi-squared goodness of fit statistic is computed following Newey(1985):  
  [ ( )] [ ( )]' ff    
-1 m θ R m θ  












    ,  
-1 -1 R (WVW')  and 
-1 W=I-G(G AG) ' G'A. The majority of the 
existing  studies  estimating  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  used  this  general  form  of 
specification test to assess the goodness of fit of the model. However, in most cases, all models 
have been rejected. Baker and Solon (2003), Baker (1997), Leamer (1983) criticized these type 
of tests for several reasons. First, Baker and Solon (2003) and Leamer (1983) underlined that 
“diagnostic tests such as goodness-of-fit tests, without explicit alternative hypothesis, are useless, 
since if the sample size is large enough, any maintained hypothesis will be rejected…. Such tests 
therefore degenerate into elaborate rituals for measuring the effective sample size.” Second, as 
pointed by Baker and Solon (2003), an additional problem is that these specification tests have 
inflated  size  in  small  samples  and  the  inflation  is  positively  related  with  the  number  of 
overidentifying restrictions. For example, Baker (1997) revealed through a Monte Carlo study, 
that for a test with fewer than 150 overidentifying restrictions, the critical values are 40%-50% 
greater than the critical values based on the asymptotic theory. Therefore, we decided to report 
this statistic as a reference, but not to use it to assess the goodness of fit of our model. 34 
 
To test between nested models, we could use Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984) or the LR 
test. Based on Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984), assuming that the general model has p 
parameters, to test between two nested models, one in which  1 k  parameters are restricted to 0 (
1 pk   ) and one in which 2 k
9 parameters are restricted to 0 (
2 pk   ), Chamberlain (1984) showed 
that the incremental chi square statistic 
12 p k p k      follows a chi-squared distribution with 









Under the null hypothesis, LR is follows a chi-square distribution with d.o.f equal to the number 
of restrictions  12 kk  . 













The smaller the value of BIC and AIC are the better the fit is. The difference between the two is 
that BIC incorporates a higher penalty for additional parameters than AIC and is recommended 
as the first choice.  
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Germany 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
25018  26059  25806  24889  23290  22955  21909  20703 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  23956  25224  24197  22814  22321  21290  20107 
 
%  66.99  67.37  66.2  63.01  64.84  64.86  64.39 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  3448  3461  4119  3932  3055  2787  2766 
%  9.64  9.24  11.27  10.86  8.87  8.49  8.86 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1885  2182  1892  3280  2951  2924  2830 
%  5.27  5.83  5.18  9.06  8.57  8.91  9.06 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6470  6576  6345  6180  6100  5826  5524 
%  18.09  17.56  17.36  17.07  17.72  17.75  17.69 
Total 
 
Frequencies  35759  37443  36553  36206  34427  32827  31227 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 2. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Denmark 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with positive 
earnings 
20899  20399  19190  19062  17321  16235  15678  15380 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the sample in 
previous year 
 
Frequencies  19854  18527  18110  16442  15334  14865  14642 
 
%  68.74  66.59  69.43  66.23  67.41  69.6  71.6 




Frequencies  1535  1744  951  899  732  658  958 
%  5.31  6.27  3.65  3.62  3.22  3.08  4.68 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2440  3096  2914  3603  2922  2133  1775 
%  8.45  11.13  11.17  14.51  12.85  9.99  8.68 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  5054  4454  4110  3881  3759  3703  3074 
%  17.5  16.01  15.76  15.63  16.53  17.34  15.03 
Total 
 
Frequencies  28883  27821  26085  24825  22747  21359  20449 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 3. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Belgium 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790  33277 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790 
 
%  63.43  63.65  64.38  63.88  64.28  65.15  64.38 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  3810  5127  4378  3601  3040  3090  2540 
%  7.26  10.08  8.93  7.52  6.8  7.33  6.34 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4145  3798  3473  4803  4421  3851  4930 
%  7.9  7.46  7.08  10.04  9.89  9.14  12.31 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  11228  9573  9614  8882  8504  7748  6798 
%  21.4  18.81  19.61  18.56  19.03  18.38  16.97 
Total 
 
Frequencies  52460  50882  49029  47861  44696  42149  40058 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 4. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Netherlands 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
20221  22100  22892  22753  22863  23233  24065  24130 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  20578  21328  21221  21055  20545  21026  21341 
 
%  69.07  71.37  68.68  67.52  67.24  68.56  69.59 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  2418  2356  2536  2120  1984  1840  1689 
%  8.12  7.88  8.21  6.8  6.49  6  5.51 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2941  1889  2591  3562  3984  4301  4891 
%  9.87  6.32  8.39  11.42  13.04  14.02  15.95 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  3857  4310  4550  4448  4042  3502  2745 
%  12.95  14.42  14.73  14.26  13.23  11.42  8.95 
Total 
 
Frequencies  29794  29883  30898  31185  30555  30669  30666 





   
Table 5. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Luxembourg 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
  15829  13695  14489  13403  14075  12667  12992 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 








64.75  69.48  69.33  69.81  68.71  70.39 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 





1765  1559  1505  1408  1246  954 
% 
 




3423  1663  2109  1913  2346  1940 
% 
 




2116  2267  2220  1980  2057  1926 
% 
 





20721  17987  19024  17558  18051  16277 
% 
 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 6. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – France 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings  19143  18197  17243  14014  12209  12080  12468  19143 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  19143  18197  17243  14014  12209  12080  12468 
 
%  62.47  64.76  62  52.08  54.24  55.54  60.8 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  3259  3042  3426  3006  2607  2072  1995 
%  10.64  10.83  12.32  11.17  11.58  9.53  9.73 
Attrition 
Frequencies  3371  2213  2785  5584  3531  3786  2658 
%  11  7.88  10.01  20.75  15.69  17.41  12.96 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  4871  4646  4358  4304  4162  3811  3385 
%  15.9  16.53  15.67  16  18.49  17.52  16.51 
Total 
 
Frequencies  30644  28098  27812  26908  22509  21749  20506 




Table 7. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – UK 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals 
with positive earnings 
24511  24848  25303  25278  25006  24881  24467  24511 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  24511  24848  25303  25278  25006  24881  24467 
 
%  64.59  66.31  67.06  67.04  67.36  68.33  68.58 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  4712  5053  4663  4140  3941  3607  3595 
%  12.42  13.48  12.36  10.98  10.62  9.91  10.08 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1836  966  1169  2073  1919  2153  2105 
%  4.84  2.58  3.1  5.5  5.17  5.91  5.9 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6888  6605  6597  6213  6257  5774  5510 
%  18.15  17.63  17.48  16.48  16.85  15.86  15.44 
Total 
 
Frequencies  37947  37472  37732  37704  37123  36415  35677 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Table 8. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Ireland 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals 
with positive earnings 
13937  13221  12590  12515  12435  12091  10745  9727 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  12750  12217  12212  12020  11668  10236  9507 
 
%  49.99  50.04  52.41  53.13  54.1  51.63  54.65 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  4930  4723  4254  3374  2905  2185  2307 
%  19.33  19.35  18.26  14.91  13.47  11.02  13.26 
Attrition 
Frequencies  2167  2115  1600  1936  2516  3288  2362 
%  8.5  8.66  6.87  8.56  11.66  16.59  13.58 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  5656  5359  5235  5292  4480  4116  3220 
%  22.18  21.95  22.47  23.39  20.77  20.76  18.51 
Total 
 
Frequencies  25503  24414  23301  22622  21569  19825  17396 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 39 
 
   
Table 9. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Italy 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
32633  32236  32111  29661  28865  26993  26912  25170 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  30946  31028  28717  27188  25717  25348  24139 
 
%  51.58  51.19  47.18  47.34  46.87  48.73  48.86 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  7900  7799  7670  6627  6890  5662  5027 
%  13.17  12.87  12.6  11.54  12.56  10.88  10.18 
Attrition 
Frequencies  3175  2947  5922  6030  5941  5399  5920 
%  5.29  4.86  9.73  10.5  10.83  10.38  11.98 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  17978  18836  18559  17585  16325  15610  14315 
%  29.96  31.08  30.49  30.62  29.75  30.01  28.98 
Total 
 
Frequencies  59999  60610  60868  57430  54873  52019  49401 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
  
Table 10. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Greece 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
27974  27654  26150  24865  22675  22001  21335  21929 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  26868  25946  24385  21815  20357  20443  21342 
 
%  45.83  45.69  44.98  42.09  43.52  46.06  49.72 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  7537  6813  6419  4523  4489  4427  3858 
%  12.86  12  11.84  8.73  9.6  9.97  8.99 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4417  4392  4347  7892  6222  4159  2363 
%  7.53  7.73  8.02  15.23  13.3  9.37  5.5 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  19802  19640  19068  17599  15707  15352  15365 
%  33.78  34.58  35.17  33.96  33.58  34.59  35.79 
Total 
 
Frequencies  58624  56791  54219  51829  46775  44381  42928 




Table 11. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Spain 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
22559  21863  21296  20975  20371  20580  19898  20185 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  21460  20521  20329  19456  19679  19167  19352 
 
%  47.6  48.29  48.49  48.63  52.13  52.12  56.06 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  8419  8230  7353  5970  5083  4512  4761 
%  18.67  19.37  17.54  14.92  13.46  12.27  13.79 
Attrition 
Frequencies  4467  3000  4120  4327  3188  3922  3052 
%  9.91  7.06  9.83  10.81  8.44  10.66  8.84 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  10741  10742  10121  10259  9802  9176  7357 
%  23.82  25.28  24.14  25.64  25.96  24.95  21.31 
Total 
 
Frequencies  45087  42493  41923  40012  37752  36777  34522 
%  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
  
Table 12. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Portugal 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals 
with positive earnings 
14653  15450  15379  15087  14837  14569  14604  14550 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 
the sample in previous year 
 
Frequencies  13892  14538  14321  13977  13921  13952  13942 
 
%  57.84  57.5  57.32  56.98  59.12  60.83  62.16 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 
sample in the previous year 
Unemployed 
Inactive 
Frequencies  2187  2264  2396  2019  2067  1843  1702 
%  9.11  8.95  9.59  8.23  8.78  8.04  7.59 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1701  1908  1918  2346  1956  1617  1575 
%  7.08  7.55  7.68  9.56  8.31  7.05  7.02 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6236  6573  6350  6189  5602  5525  5211 
%  25.97  26  25.42  25.23  23.79  24.09  23.23 
Total 
 
Frequencies  24016  25283  24985  24531  23546  22937  22430 








Table 13. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample – Austria 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Number of individuals with 
positive earnings 
  17944  17789  17199  16209  15162  13816  13056 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 








67.96  68.2  67.49  67.2  66.51  68.21 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 





1209  1231  906  790  803  843 
% 
 




2195  2080  2435  2470  2409  1794 
% 
 




4361  4330  4189  3842  3538  3235 
% 
 





24237  24025  23164  21653  20153  18473 
% 
 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
 




1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 




15811  15845  15895  15546  13329  13057 
Absolute number and proportion of individuals who report positive earnings in current year conditional on being in 




15246  15345  14753  12756  12588 
 
%  55.95  57.2  59.29  53.83  64.16 
Absolute number  and proportion of individuals who report no earnings in current year conditional on being in the 





3446  2327  1657  1326  1267 
%  12.65  8.67  6.66  5.6  6.46 
Attrition 
Frequencies  1933  3219  2658  5219  1708 
%  7.09  12  10.68  22.02  8.71 
Missing Wage 
Frequencies  6623  5937  5814  4398  4057 
%  24.31  22.13  23.37  18.56  20.68 
Total 
 
Frequencies  27248  26828  24882  23699  19620 
%  100  100  100  100  100 42 
 
Table 15. Error-Components Models for Log Real Hourly Earnings 
 
Germany  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium  France  Luxembourg  UK 
 
Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE 
Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate   
 
7.2609  0.0867  0.0097  0.5891  0.1913  0.0905  0.0698  0.0246      0.1071  0.0251  0.0467  0.2467 
2 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0024  0.0968      0.0002  0.0797              0.0001  0.1032 
cov( , )    -0.1313  0.0121      -0.0052  0.0005              -0.0022  0.0004 
2 exp( ) estimate          0.0014  0.1494          0.0056  0.0294         
Time loading factors                             
1,1994    1    1    1    1    1           
1,1995 
  1.0734  0.0084  1.0185  0.0210  0.9735  0.0158  0.9421  0.0116  1.0338  0.0130  1    0.9915  0.0082 
1,1996    1.1503  0.0112  0.9910  0.0209  0.9748  0.0172  1.0041  0.0122  1.0899  0.0132  1.0215  0.0220  0.9070  0.0103 
1,1997 
  1.2028  0.0142  0.9011  0.0231  0.9334  0.0159  0.9225  0.0145  1.0980  0.0147  1.1810  0.0208  0.9228  0.0126 
1,1998    1.2720  0.0215  0.9022  0.0256  0.9876  0.0169  0.8915  0.0160  1.0738  0.0174  1.2493  0.0222  0.8936  0.0146 
1,1999    1.4078  0.0188  0.7953  0.0257  0.8963  0.0184  0.7853  0.0162  1.0470  0.0179  1.3205  0.0248  0.8571  0.0154 
1,2000 
  1.5155  0.0222  0.7431  0.0287  0.8749  0.0193  0.9245  0.0170  0.9524  0.0176  1.3425  0.0314  0.7802  0.0163 
1,2001 
  1.4744  0.0280  0.7643  0.0264  0.9096  0.0208  0.9207  0.0156  0.9466  0.0168  1.2977  0.0222  0.7982  0.0175 
Cohort specific factors                              
1,40 50     1    1    1    1    1    1    1   
1,51 60     0.4401  0.0145  1.0630  0.0306  1.2748  0.0424  1.0127  0.0138  1.0020  0.0166  0.9557  0.0189  1.4131  0.0301 
1,61 70     0.2031  0.0088  1.0950  0.0704  1.3168  0.1144  0.7776  0.0105  1.2248  0.0213  0.9396  0.0183  2.0459  0.0992 
1,71 80     0.0856  0.0046  0.9890  0.1467  0.7891  0.0704  0.1425  0.0387  1.3408  0.0503  0.5933  0.0183  2.4514  0.2435 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) parameter      0.2578  0.5741  0.1315  0.2626  0.1262  0.3096  0.2439  0.1523  0.3420  0.2633  0.0186  0.1671  0.0702  0.1110 
2






0,40 50 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0044  0.7316  0.0368  0.0732  0.0228  0.0913  0.0639  0.0437  0.1139  0.0451  0.0753  0.0638  0.0764  0.0437 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0562  0.0887  0.0255  0.0810  0.0271  0.1208  0.0357  0.0663  0.1078  0.0727  0.1064  0.1109  0.0789  0.0605 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0419  0.0940  0.0349  0.0725  0.0112  0.2073  0.0392  0.0535  0.0821  0.0575  0.0672  0.1136  0.0750  0.0681 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0832  0.0679  0.0284  0.0705  0.0406  0.0962  0.0347  0.0596  0.1290  0.0855  0.0225  0.1220  0.0313  0.1179 
   0.3583  0.0223  0.5472  0.0732  0.3289  0.0118  0.6280  0.0104  0.4443  0.0205  0.2389  0.0161  0.4512  0.0125 
                              
Time loading factors                             
2,1994    1    1    1    1    1        1   
2,1995 
  0.4531  0.1298  0.3697  0.0502  0.4936  0.0756  0.2941  0.0226  0.4464  0.0581  1    0.8214  0.0418 
2,1996    0.3801  0.1088  0.3548  0.0508  0.4839  0.0771  0.2396  0.0181  0.3165  0.0434  1.9774  0.1487  0.8135  0.0475 
2,1997    0.3480  0.1008  0.3531  0.0483  0.4839  0.0756  0.2677  0.0202  0.3479  0.0467  1.4402  0.1377  0.7179  0.0406 
2,1998 
  0.3511  0.1013  0.3077  0.0409  0.3287  0.0505  0.2784  0.0209  0.3893  0.0503  1.0818  0.0915  0.7025  0.0359 
2,1999    0.3886  0.1121  0.4086  0.0543  0.3875  0.0605  0.3371  0.0255  0.3770  0.0484  1.2422  0.1019  0.7140  0.0377 
2,2000 
  0.2918  0.0841  0.3980  0.0538  0.4541  0.0710  0.2704  0.0201  0.3954  0.0515  1.3644  0.1127  0.8482  0.0482 
2,2001 
  0.3957  0.1147  0.3595  0.0484  0.5629  0.0877  0.3255  0.0257  0.3910  0.0517  1.4003  0.1195  0.7977  0.0453 
Cohort specific factors                             
2,40 50     1    1    1    1    1    1    1   
2,51 60     0.9547  0.0299  1.1521  0.0265  1.0459  0.0294  1.0555  0.0189  0.9551  0.0236  0.8573  0.0355  0.8949  0.0171 
2,61 70     0.9643  0.0268  1.2128  0.0205  1.1180  0.0313  0.9996  0.0140  1.0459  0.0239  1.0445  0.0429  0.9938  0.0182 
2,71 80     1.3832  0.0411  1.8237  0.0325  1.7278  0.0464  1.3569  0.0233  1.3873  0.0345  1.4318  0.0595  1.1898  0.0224 
SSR  0.0143  0.0068  0.0099  0.0047  0.0208  0.0222  0.0061 
2    2473.7073  5872.5492  2492.7787  17769.4220  1996.7248  1632.2320  2597.3157 
LogL  459.2576  512.8864  486.0084  540.0406  432.2749  318.4753  520.5053 44 
 
Table 15. Error-Components Models for Log Real Hourly Earnings (continued) 
 
Ireland  Italy  Greece  Spain  Portugal  Austria  Finland 
 
Param.  SE  Param.  Param.  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE 
Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.0483  0.4109  0.0325  0.0325  0.0779  0.0915  0.294  0.059      0.0811  0.0449  0.0616  0.2703 
2 exp( ) estimate   
 
0.00015  0.1547  0.00008  0.00008  0.0002  0.0582  0.000  0.000          0.0001  0.1399 
cov( , )    -0.0026  0.0007  -0.0014  -0.0014  -0.0034  0.0003  -0.006  0.001          -0.0023  0.0005 
2 exp( ) estimate                      0.0074  0.0388         
Time loading factors                             
1,1994    1    1    1    1    1           
1,1995 
  0.9872  0.0108  0.9529  0.0112  1.0205  0.0145  1.010  0.012  0.9921  0.0144  1       
1,1996    0.9342  0.0118  0.9548  0.0184  0.9970  0.0194  0.973  0.017  1.0646  0.0164  1.0112  0.0244  1   
1,1997    0.9749  0.0161  0.9085  0.0212  1.0386  0.0229  0.972  0.022  1.0477  0.0189  1.0570  0.0287  1.1265  0.0193 
1,1998 
  0.9288  0.0175  0.9868  0.0267  1.0104  0.0239  0.976  0.027  1.0558  0.0207  0.9843  0.0291  1.0778  0.0232 
1,1999    0.8714  0.0184  0.9983  0.0292  1.0606  0.0238  0.959  0.032  1.0140  0.0232  0.9081  0.0379  1.0173  0.0274 
1,2000 
  0.8073  0.0208  0.9704  0.0307  0.9236  0.0227  0.898  0.036  1.1016  0.0270  0.9403  0.0391  0.9554  0.0266 
1,2001 
  0.7910  0.0241  0.9476  0.0335  0.9267  0.0207  0.867  0.040  1.0611  0.0260  0.9425  0.0384  1.0297  0.0309 
Cohort specific factors                             
1,40 50     1    1    1    1    1    1    1   
1,51 60     1.3479  0.0444  1.2272  0.0463  1.3261  0.0233  1.162  0.074  1.0664  0.0236  0.8921  0.0198  1.3819  0.0485 
1,61 70     1.9458  0.1552  1.3857  0.1189  1.9371  0.0811  0.988  0.120  1.1664  0.0288  0.8354  0.0262  2.4403  0.1705 
1,71 80     2.7833  0.4487  1.5606  0.2008  3.9268  0.4940  0.475  0.078  0.8031  0.0581  0.4591  0.0293  2.9792  0.7975 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) parameter      0.0284  0.1707  0.0582  0.0758  0.1183  0.0750  0.099  0.006  0.0724  0.1082  0.4830  0.1811  0.0555  0.2197 
2




0,40 50 exp( ) estimate   
 
    0.0314  0.0898  0.0791  0.0516      0.0903  0.0945      0.0550  0.0743 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate   
 
    0.0422  0.0619  0.0574  0.0702      0.1247  0.1219      0.0588  0.0701 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate   
 
    0.0521  0.0592  0.1011  0.0436      0.0880  0.0914      0.0707  0.0727 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate   
 
    0.0283  0.0919  0.0695  0.1269      0.0492  0.0781      0.0464  0.1098 
   0.2912  0.0249  0.6438  0.0428  0.5995  0.0346  0.849  0.024  0.7353  0.0143  0.7009  0.0292  0.2904  0.0195 
       -0.2506  0.0204  -0.1487  0.0242  -0.364  0.007             
Time loading factors                             
2,1994    1    1    1    1    1           
2,1995 
  1.2064  0.0955  0.7692  0.0239  0.7991  0.0261  0.907  0.027  0.9301  0.0338  1       
2,1996    1.2529  0.1063  0.8238  0.0294  0.6992  0.0277  0.815  0.024  0.7194  0.0366  0.2929  0.0291  1   
2,1997    1.0088  0.0808  0.7296  0.0241  0.6171  0.0280  0.842  0.024  0.7369  0.0374  0.2089  0.0224  0.8849  0.0977 
2,1998 
  1.0628  0.0849  0.7536  0.0264  0.6269  0.0275  0.887  0.023  0.7464  0.0385  0.1724  0.0196  0.7069  0.0809 
2,1999    1.0255  0.0829  0.6516  0.0242  0.6106  0.0256  0.760  0.021  0.7197  0.0373  0.2270  0.0223  0.9301  0.0957 
2,2000 
  1.0557  0.0905  0.6656  0.0225  0.7195  0.0287  0.821  0.022  0.7070  0.0345  0.2203  0.0220  0.8191  0.0861 
2,2001 
  1.0910  0.1010  0.6998  0.0234  0.6657  0.0287  0.856  0.023  0.7791  0.0391  0.2248  0.0229  0.7937  0.0852 
Cohort specific factors                             
2,40 50     1    1    1    1    1    1    1   
2,51 60     0.9767  0.0360  0.9894  0.0204  0.9608  0.0179  1.004  0.025  0.8889  0.0337  0.8410  0.0254  0.8609  0.0253 
2,61 70     1.1651  0.0352  1.0324  0.0217  1.0187  0.0183  1.051  0.025  1.0122  0.0334  0.8986  0.0280  0.8714  0.0252 
2,71 80     1.1793  0.0385  1.3299  0.0278  0.9443  0.0256  1.330  0.030  1.1381  0.0349  1.1979  0.0416  1.2070  0.0349 
SSR  0.0276  0.0017  0.0146  0.0094  0.0266  0.0052     
2    2324.4346  1576.2281  3824.4496  1984.9587  3222.0626  2229.2852     
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Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory Predicted Components for Selected 































































































































Figure 5. Predicted Permanent and Transitory Components of Earnings as % of Predicted Overall Variance 
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Figure 5. Predicted Permanent and Transitory Components of Earnings as % of Predicted Overall Variance for 
Selected Cohorts: 1994-2001 (continued) 53 
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